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DENYING DEATH
Teneille R. Brown*

Terminal cancer patients are being kept in the dark about the purpose of their
care. Several studies show that these patients undergo expensive and painful
interventions because they are holding out hope for a cure, even when their
physicians know that a cure is very unlikely. The current Medicare reimbursement
system encourages this false hope by incentivizing physicians to medicate and
operate on patients, rather than to talk about whether or why to do these things.
Our culture also encourages this false hope by treating cancer as a war that must
be won. As a result, patients are admitted to the ICU, infused with toxic
chemotherapy, and operated upon within the last few days of their lives. They
pursue risky, painful, and expensive treatments that they might not otherwise
undergo if they knew they were gaining weeks instead of months, or not gaining
any time at all. Whatever their wishes for their death, a substantial number of
patients are not given a chance to articulate them because nobody asks. This
situation is a disaster on many levels. In this Article, I explore the reasons for this
complex phenomenon—scouring the medical, psychological, and legal literature. I
then conclude with ten legal mechanisms that could be used to cut against this
current state of affairs.
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INTRODUCTION
A. Our Cultural Denial of Death
From the moment each of us is born we must balance the exhilaration of
new beginnings with the absolute certainty of death. And even though we are
superficially aware of our mortality, most do not want to be reminded of it. Our
reluctance to acknowledge death is perhaps due to a superstitious belief that “if we
do not talk about something, it does not exist.”1 This is as true for advanced cancer
patients as it is for those of us who are healthy.
Death is an inevitable part of life, yet we Americans put off talking about
it until we cannot talk anymore. And then—in a flash—a sudden health crisis
strikes and decisions are made without much reflection. We miss the chance to
explain our final wishes.2 We crash. Chest compressions begin.3 We are rushed to
the emergency room and a ventilator is placed down our throats, which helps us
breathe, but takes away our ability to speak. We are admitted to an intensive care
unit (“ICU”). The window for communication closes. We now must place our lives
in the unenviable custody of others. They will struggle to speak for us and will try
to imagine whether they would be letting us down by letting us go. So instead,
they tell the physicians to “do everything.” This means that an alarming number of
us in America will die in hospitals with plastic tubes in our noses, mouths, necks,
chests, and bladders, feeding our stomachs, oxygenating our lungs, or dialyzing

1.
Instead of confronting our mortality head on, we shroud it in cartoons where
the villains are “shot with rifles, crushed by gigantic boulders, blown to pieces by
dynamite . . . only to jump to their feet (after the laughter stops) to be ‘killed’ again.”
RICHARD DUMONT & DENNIS FOSS, THE AMERICAN VIEW OF DEATH: ACCEPTANCE OR
DENIAL? 36 (1972). We also use elaborate euphemisms around our death rituals, hide
morgues, and consider people who talk about death to have poor manners.
2.
Many patients with cancer do not discuss the benefits and risks of intensive
care with their clinicians before it is needed, and their code status (whether they wish to
receive CPR) is often unknown or undocumented. Christopher G. Slatore et al., Reply to F.
Vincent et al and S.M.H. Alibhai, 30 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 3652–53 (2012) (citing
Cristina A. Reichner et al., Outcome and Code Status of Lung Cancer Patients Admitted to
the Medical ICU, 130 CHEST 719 (2006)).
3.
Alexi A. Wright et al., Associations Between End-of-Life Discussions,
Patient Mental Health, Medical Care Near Death, and Caregiver Bereavement Adjustment,
300 JAMA 1665, 1665 (2008). In this study, end-of-life discussions were associated with
lower rates of ventilation, cardiopulmonary resuscitation, ICU admission, and earlier
hospice enrollment. This means that if patients are asked, they are likely to say that they do
not want these intensive interventions.
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our kidneys.4 We compel the broad use of technologies that were developed for
narrower purposes, and we mistake artificial mechanics for the presence of life. 5
But not all of us will die like this. Many of us will have long, drawn-out,
negotiated deaths due to terminal illnesses like cancer. And even in these
nonemergency cases when our death is less imminent, we often still miss the
opportunity for deep, personal end-of-life (“EOL”) conversations about where we
would like to die, with whom, and how. 6 This is why, for many Americans, the
modern dying experience is “deplorable and in need of full reconstitution,” as well
as “painful, lonely and invasive.”7
Of course it was not always this way. Before the twentieth century, our
friends and neighbors died earlier, sensitizing us to death’s inevitable return. 8
Women died in childbirth, babies died before their first birthdays, risky bloodletting procedures actually made our conditions worse, and wounds became too
infected to treat. Fewer of us died of old age. We died at home with our families
gathered by our bedside. We tried to practice the good or “holy” death, where we
gracefully accepted the will of God, welcomed the chance to atone for our sins,
and did not treat illness as a war to be won. 9

4.
Nearly 40% of all deaths nationwide occur in the acute care setting and 20%
involve the use of intensive care services. See Derek C. Angus et al., Use of Intensive Care
at the End of Life in the United States: An Epidemiologic Study, 32 CRITICAL CARE MED.
638, 639–41 (2004). Twenty percent of elderly Americans die in intensive-care services and
of these patients, about half undergo mechanical ventilation and a quarter undergo CPR in
the days before death. However, the intensity of EOL care varies substantially based upon
the facility where patients receive care. See Alvin C. Kwok et al., The Intensity and
Variation of Surgical Care at the End of Life: A Retrospective Cohort Study, 378 LANCET
1408, 1408 (2011).
5.
Murray Enkin, Alejandro R. Jadad & Richard Smith, Death Can Be Our
Friend: Embracing the Inevitable Would Reduce Both Unnecessary Suffering and Costs,
343 BRIT. MED. J. 1277, 1277 (2011) (“Too many people are dying undignified graceless
deaths in hospital wards or intensive care units, with doctors battling against death way past
the point that is humane.”).
6.
The impetus for this Article came from a close friend who worked in a
cancer hospital and lamented the fact that terminal cancer patients who were dying in the
ICU had never had an oncologist or nurse talk to them about their EOL goals of care. She
was the first person to ask them how they would like to die, despite the fact that they had
been seen dozens of times by physicians at that facility.
7.
Sean O’Mahony et al., A Review of Barriers to Utilization of the Medicare
Hospice Benefits in Urban Populations and Strategies for Enhanced Access, 85 J. URB.
HEALTH 281, 281–83 (2008).
8.
SAMUEL MORRIS BROWN, IN HEAVEN AS IT IS ON EARTH: JOSEPH SMITH AND
THE EARLY MORMON CONQUEST OF DEATH 20 (2012).
9.
DREW GILPIN FAUST, THIS REPUBLIC OF SUFFERING: DEATH AND THE
AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 6 (2008) (“The concept of the Good Death was central to midnineteenth-century America, as it had long been at the core of Christian practice. Dying was
an art, and the tradition of ars moriendi had provided rules for conduct for the moribund and
their attendants since at least the fifteenth century: how to give up one’s soul ‘gladlye and
wilfully’; how to meet the devil’s temptations of unbelief, despair, impatience, and worldly
attachment . . . .”).
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Sociologists and historians tell us that the way we practice death is
intensely cultural. As our culture has changed, so too has the way we die. Due
mostly to public health measures and expanded insurance coverage of the elderly,
the average American life expectancy has nearly doubled from 47 years in 1900 to
78 in 2008.10 This is a remarkable human achievement in such a short time. The
development of sanitary water supplies, antiseptics, and antibiotics means that we
do not die as frequently of acute infections.11 Instead, death comes later and more
often from chronic diseases like congestive heart failure, diabetes, or cancer—the
gifts of progress.
Not only are common causes of death affecting us later in life, we are also
more methodical in our management of them. Where Americans used to rely on
experimental “treatments,” we now have drugs and devices that are assessed, albeit
imperfectly, by the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) to determine their
safety and effectiveness. The substantial investment in clinical research has paid
off. We can cure many diseases and have proved the efficacy of treatments through
clinical trials.
This medical innovation is a huge success when the drugs or devices are
used appropriately. But the expanded use of medical treatments can cause mayhem
when clinical goals are poorly defined. In many instances where no one has
discussed the patient’s EOL preferences with them, the “treatments” that are
offered may not be treating anything at all. Instead, the next clinical arrow in the
quiver just provides another means of avoiding the tricky conversation about a
patient’s death.
B. Cancer Exceptionalism Fosters Our Cultural Denial of Death
We had no difficulty explaining the specific dangers of various
treatment options, but we never really touched on the reality of
his disease. His oncologists, radiation therapists, surgeons, and
other doctors had all seen him through months of treatments for a
problem that they knew could not be cured. We could never bring
ourselves to discuss the larger truth about his condition or the
ultimate limits of our capabilities, let alone what might matter
most to him as he neared the end of his life. If he was pursuing a
delusion, so were we.12
The quote above is from Dr. Atul Gawande’s insightful 2014 book, Being
Mortal. In it, Dr. Gawande describes with moving detail how physicians and
10.
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
2012, at 77 tbl.104 (2012), http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/12statab/vitstat.pdf; see
also Muriel R. Gillick, How Medicare Shapes the Way We Die, 8 J. HEALTH & BIOMED. L.
27, 33 (2012).
11.
There are some data to suggest that our life expectancies continued to rise in
the latter part of the twentieth century and was correlated with passage of the Medicare Act.
However, other countries saw an increase in their life expectancies around the same time, so
it is not clear whether the correlation is in fact causal. See Gillick, supra note 10, at 33.
12.
ATUL GAWANDE, BEING MORTAL: MEDICINE AND WHAT MATTERS IN THE
END 5–6 (2014).
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patients collaborate to deny death. While Dr. Gawande takes on this phenomenon
generally, he uses compelling patient narratives from his terminal cancer patients
to illustrate this point. The problem that he identifies—that our healthcare system
perpetuates death denial—is particularly acute when seen through the lens of
cancer patients.
In many ways, cancer is different. Cancer hijacks our bodies’ natural
production systems and makes them go haywire. Cancer cells sinisterly take refuge
in hidden corners of our bodies and then cleverly mutate to evade new drug
treatments. The “C-word” used to be so feared that physicians did not utter its
name in the presence of patients. 13 Cancer is cruel. It strikes innocent people
without warning, people who do not seem to have done anything to deserve its
wrath. In many ways, cancer is not treated as a disease at all. It is personified. It is
a thing with intention: to destroy us. As far as chronic diseases go, cancer is not
wholly unique in these ways. Still, there is something about our cultural response
to it that renders the biography of cancer inimitable.
As Siddhartha Mukherjee describes in The Emperor of All Maladies: A
Biography of Cancer, cancer possesses uniquely modern and seductive
metaphors. 14 Cancer is a fierce, territorial, desperate, malevolent, and evolving
colonizer of our bodies. It demands a worthy combatant, and we are called upon to
wage a war on the group of diseases cast as the monolith of “cancer.” 15 Patients are
expected to be hopeful, to fight the war against their evil enemy, and to win. There
is no war on diabetes—no war on heart attacks.
At Utah’s distinguished Huntsman Cancer Institute (located on a cul-desac called the “Circle of Hope”), a patient has the encouraging message of “hope”
presented to her on a mural in the lobby, on a large plaque in the elevator bank,
and in selected inspirational quotes throughout the gift shop and building. The
website for the hospital also highlights three institutional goals at the top of the
homepage: (1) hope through research; (2) hope through education; and (3) hope
through patient care. 16 Noticeably, there are no such merchants of hope for
diabetes patients or patients with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease
(“COPD”)—two diseases that regularly cause premature death.
The purpose of this Article will be to investigate the significant role
cancer plays in our cultural denial of death. I will also analyze the legal structures,

13.
See Gregory W. Ruhnke et al., Ethical Decision Making and Patient
Autonomy: A Comparison of Physicians and Patients in Japan and the United States, 118
CHEST 1172, 1173 (2000) (“Disclosure of a cancer diagnosis to the patient, for example, is a
relatively recent phenomenon. Of US doctors surveyed in 1961, 88% generally did not
inform their cancer patients of the diagnosis; by 1979, 98% generally did so. Physicianpatient communication in the United States is now characterized by an emphasis on patient
autonomy, which has become institutionalized by legally mandated informed consent
procedures and the ideal of information disclosure.”).
14.
SIDDARTHA MUKHERJEE, THE EMPEROR OF ALL MALADIES: A BIOGRAPHY OF
CANCER 39 (2010).
15.
Id. at 172–73.
16.
See
HUNTSMAN
CANCER
INST.,
http://www.healthcare.utah.edu/huntsmancancerinstitute/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2015).
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such as Medicare reimbursement policies, that perpetuate this death denial. These
legal mechanisms often operate by encouraging unrealistic hope and aggressive
care at the end of cancer patients’ lives.

I. A PREVALENT PROBLEM: INCURABLE CANCER PATIENTS THINK
THEY CAN BE CURED
Death by cancer is becoming much more common. Roughly one in three
women and one in two men will be diagnosed with cancer in their lifetime. 17
Nearly one-quarter of all deaths in the United States are from cancer. 18 Of those
Americans who will die of cancer, the majority will be taken by one diagnosis:
lung cancer. This Article will focus mostly on the data surrounding the treatment
of lung cancer by the U.S. healthcare system.
The prognoses for most lung, brain, pancreatic, liver, and ovarian cancers
are incredibly grim and have only improved modestly over the last 30 years. This
is in part because screening tools are ineffective, and advanced symptoms, like
persistent coughing, may be confused with bronchitis. As a result, the most
common deadly cancer, lung cancer, is typically not diagnosed until after the
tumors have spread, or metastasized, to other areas of the body. There are four
stages of lung cancer, which represent how large the tumor is and how much the
tumor has metastasized through the body. Doctors stage lung cancer through the
use of blood tests, tissue biopsies, and radiological scans of the chest. In stage I,
the tumor is confined to the lung, in stages II and III the tumor may reach the
lymph nodes. In stage IV, the tumor has spread outside of the lung to other parts of
the body. Almost 70% of lung cancer patients have progressed to stage III or IV by
the time of diagnosis. In stage IV, where the five-year survival rate is less than
1%, 19 the oncology team’s efforts are aimed at treating the side effects of the
disease, not the disease itself. Similarly, by the time most ovarian, pancreatic,
brain, and mesothelioma tumors are detected, the focus is on treating side effects
rather than curing the underlying disease.
To put it bluntly, from the moment patients find out they have these
common cancers, there is usually zero possibility for a cure. 20 Visits to the
hospital’s ICU then—to drain fluid, give pain medications, or remove a tumor that
is making them uncomfortable—are generally palliative, not therapeutic. 21 The
17.
MUKHERJEE, supra note 14, at ix.
18.
Id. Cancer is slowly edging out heart disease as the number one killer in
America. Id.
19.
NAT’L CANCER INST., SEER STAT FACT SHEETS: LUNG AND BRONCHUS
CANCER, http://www.seer.cancer.gov/statfacts/html/lungb.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2015).
This survival rate is based on people who were diagnosed with nonsmall-cell lung cancer
between 1998 and 2000. Id.
20.
See Jane C. Weeks et al., Patients’ Expectations About Effects of
Chemotherapy for Advanced Cancer, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1616, 1617 (2012).
21.
In addition to describing a type of intervention, there is also an entire
medical specialty called palliative care. Palliative care physicians focus on pain
management and physical comfort. While the service used to be associated with hospice
almost exclusively, it has become much more integrated into inpatient and outpatient cancer
care. Like hospice, early referral to palliative care results in fewer emergency room visits,
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distinction, between improving the quality of life and treating the underlying
disease, has been shown to be quite significant to nurses and physicians when
making clinical decisions. 22 However, the dichotomy between the goals of
palliative and therapeutic care is all too often obscured in the minds of terminal
cancer patients.
A. What Terminal Cancer Patients Say They Want to Be Told
We have quite a bit of data as to what terminal cancer patients say they
want to be told. Despite important individual differences, nearly all patients asked
in the last 20 years have said that they want “full disclosure” about their prognosis,
treatment options, and their expected survival outcomes.23 Though the Institute of
Medicine issued a report 15 years ago that called for this, most patients still do not
have frank and ongoing conversations with their oncologists about their EOL goals
of care.24 Of course, sometimes a gap exists between what patients report that they
would like to know (everything), and what they may actually want to know when
confronted with the reality of terminal cancer (only the hopeful stuff). In one small
study of terminal patients receiving palliative care, all patients desired their doctor
to be “honest,” yet only 70% wanted to know the likelihood of a cure, and only
60% wanted to know their life expectancy. 25 Having stopped therapeutic measures,
hospitalizations, and hospital deaths in the last 30 days of life. In a multivariate analysis,
outpatient palliative-care referral was independently associated with less aggressive EOL
care. See David Hui et al., Impact of Timing and Setting of Palliative Care Referral on
Quality of End-of-Life Care in Cancer Patients, 120 CANCER 1743, 1746 (2014); Raymond
W. Jang et al., Palliative Care and the Aggressiveness of End-of-Life Care in Patients with
Advanced Pancreatic Cancer, 107 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 1, 3–4 (2015).
22.
See Hilde M. Buiting et al., Understanding Provision of Chemotherapy to
Patients with End Stage Cancer: Qualitative Interview Study, 342 BRIT. MED. J. 1, 9 (2011).
One general hospital physician from the interview study agreed:
Yes, I think the distinction [between a palliative and therapeutic
approach] is always extremely important. I think it is important for the
patient to know that, but it also has a tremendous impact on the way you
administer the course of treatment. . . . In the case of palliative treatment,
a holiday awkwardly planned in the middle of that treatment suddenly
becomes nevertheless very important so that you have to adapt the
treatment schedule accordingly.
Id. at 3.
23.
Robin Matsuyama et al., Why Do Patients Choose Chemotherapy near the
End of Life? A Review of the Perspective of Those Facing Death from Cancer, 24 J.
CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 3490, 3494 (2006); see also Tracy M. Robinson et al., PatientOncologist Communication in Advanced Cancer: Predictors of Patient Perception of
Prognosis, 16 SUPPORT CARE CANCER 1049, 1050 (2008) (“Many patients desire that their
physicians provide detailed prognostic information in a direct and honest manner.”).
24.
Matsuyama et al., supra note 23, at 3494; see also MARILYN J. FIELD &
CHRISTINE K. CASSEL, APPROACHING DEATH: IMPROVING CARE AT THE END OF LIFE 61–64
(1997).
25.
See K.C. Kadakia et al., Palliative Communications: Addressing
Chemotherapy in Patients with Advanced Cancer, 23 ANNALS OF ONCOLOGY iii29, iii29
(2012) (citing Jean S. Kutner et al., Information Needs in Terminal Illness, 48 SOC. SCI. &
MED. 1341, 1341–52 (1999)).
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this willful ignorance may be because the patients knew that the number would be
small.
There are many reasons why patients are not receiving full disclosure
about their treatment options and survival outcomes. One reason is that physicians
“pass the buck” and assume that someone else will have the difficult conversation
with the patient. Intensive care doctors cannot assume that the oncologist has
discussed EOL care, and oncologists cannot make the reverse assumption.
Physicians cannot wash their hands of any EOL conversations, hoping that
someone else will take care of them. Depending on the context, patients might be
more willing to open up to particular doctors over others. For example, while most
patients do not want to be kept in the dark regarding their prognosis, it seems that
some would prefer to discuss their EOL plans with the physician that admits them
into the ICU rather than their regular oncologist.26 In other words, some patients
would prefer to bring up their desires for hospice or withdrawal of care with
someone that they have only just met, rather than someone with whom they have
an extensive clinical history. This may seem counter-intuitive, but data suggest
that patients might be afraid to raise the possibility of transitioning to palliative
care with their oncologists because they worry that their oncologist will perceive
them as giving up on the fight. Ironically, they do not want to let their
oncologists—who have become their co-pilots in the battle against cancer—down.
An ICU doctor, therefore, may present the outside perspective that the patient
needs to voice her true desires. This again speaks to the cultural denial of death in
most oncology practices; patients feel the need to distance themselves from their
oncologists in order to feel free to discuss the reality of their death.
Another reason patients are not receiving the full disclosure they desire is
that physicians seek to maintain hope for the patient’s loved ones. Physicians
assume that surrogate decision-makers prefer hope over the truth when discussing
prognoses, in order to not become too overwhelmed by the gravity of their loved
ones’ situations. Once again, data suggest that this assumption does not hold. In
face-to-face interviews with 179 surrogate decision-makers, 93% of the surrogates
considered avoidance of prognosis discussions to be an “unacceptable way of
maintaining hope.”27 The main explanation that surrogates gave for this response
was that a “timely discussion of prognosis is essential to allow family members to
prepare emotionally and logistically for the possibility of a patient’s death.” 28
26.
Nancy L. Keating et al., Physician Factors Associated with Discussions
About End-of-Life Care, 116 CANCER 998, 1003 (2010) (“A small study of hospitalized
cancer patients found that only 9% had discussed advance care preferences with their
outpatient oncologist and only 23% of the remaining patients reported wanting to do so,
although 58% of patients supported policies requiring housestaff to discuss advance care
preferences at hospital admission.”) (citing Elizabeth B. Lamont & Mark Siegler,
Paradoxes in Cancer Patients’ Advance Care Planning, 3 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 27, 27–35
(2000)).
27.
Latifat Apatira et al., Hope, Truth, and Preparing for Death: Perspectives of
Surrogate Decision-Makers, 149 ANN. INTERNAL MED. 861, 861 (2008).
28.
Id. at 861–62. One limitation of the Apatira study is that the researchers did
not assess the psychological outcomes of family members who did and who did not receive
the prognostic information they say that they wanted.
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Surrogate decision-makers also felt that without accurate prognosis information,
they could not fulfill their role of supporting the patient’s preferences and
emotional needs.29 In sum, those surrounding the patient do not appreciate when
clinicians obscure the truth about the prognosis, even if clinicians only do so in
order to maintain hope.
Again, counter-intuitively, even when the hard truth is shared with
patients, researchers have found that patients remain hopeful. In fact, advanced
cancer patients maintain hope about their future even after they are given a poor
prognosis, told there is a low likelihood of response to treatment, and told there is
no chance for a cure.30 It is thought that receipt of honest prognostic information is
an important component of hope because it empowers patients in their decisionmaking about medical care.31 Even surrogates, who understood that the physician
regarded the patient’s prognosis as grim tended to remain hopeful in the face of
this. Surrogates could recount the physician’s estimate for survival, but personally
believed that the patient was twice as likely to survive the cancer.32
Further complicating the idea that avoiding EOL discussions encourages
hope, another study found that the parents of children with cancer were more
hopeful, rather than less, when they received increased prognosis disclosure.33 This
held true even when the likelihood for a cure was low. 34 While this data may not
extrapolate to larger groups, it does provide a basis for challenging the common
assumption that providing prognostic information, even when it is incredibly grim,
will devastate our capacity for hope. Many patients will find it empowering to
have this prognostic information and to participate in treatment decision-making.35
Remarkably, many will still find a way to remain hopeful in the face of near
certain death.
To respond to a patient’s unique disclosure preferences, any EOL
discussion should begin with the physician asking the patient what she would like
to be told and how much she would like to participate in decisions regarding her

29.
Id. at 865.
30.
Jennifer W. Mack & Thomas J. Smith, Reasons Why Physicians Do Not
Have Discussions About Poor Prognosis, Why it Matters, and What Can Be Improved, 30 J.
CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 2715, 2715 (2012).
31.
Id.
32.
Susan J. Lee Char et al., A Randomized Trial of Two Methods to Disclose
Prognosis to Surrogate Decision Makers in Intensive Care Units, 182 AM. J. RESPIRATORY
CRITICAL CARE MED. 905, 907 (2010) (observing that surrogates were not far off when
responding to questions about the physician’s estimate for prognosis, but they thought the
physicians were wrong; when asked what they themselves thought their loved one’s
prognosis was, they were much more optimistic).
33.
The respondents were mostly white, married, well-educated women. It is not
clear whether these results would extrapolate to other parent groups. Jennifer W. Mack et
al., Hope and Prognostic Disclosure, 25 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 5636, 5638 (2007).
34.
Id.
35.
Natasha Leighl et al., Discussing Adjuvant Cancer Therapy, 19 J. CLINICAL
ONCOLOGY 1768, 1768 (2001) (“Among cancer patients, those who are offered choices in
their treatment show better psychologic adjustment, and those who feel they have little
control over their disease and treatment have a poorer psychosocial outcome.”).
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care. When a patient states that she does not want to participate in her EOL
decision-making, physicians must explore the reasons for this to correct any
factual misconceptions about the disease or its potential treatment. Although
asking patients what they already know about the disease progression and the EOL
decision-making process may be unpleasant, it can ensure that patients are making
an informed choice. Regardless of the patient’s answer, their disclosure
preferences should be respected so long as it is autonomous and informed.36
B. Empirical Data Confirm Terminal Cancer Patients Are Being Kept in the
Dark
Studies have shown that roughly one-third of all terminal lung cancer
patients believe their cancer can be cured,37 and if the question is asked in terms of
the likelihood of being cured, roughly 70% of lung cancer patients and 80% of
colorectal cancer patients do not realize that a cure is “not at all likely.”38 Of
course, the progression of some breast, skin, and prostate cancers may be
successfully halted, making the pursuit of a cure a realistic goal. However, other
common cancers, such as mesothelioma, small-cell lung, or pancreatic cancer have
median survival periods of about six to eight months after diagnosis—and fewer
than 10% make it to five years.39 For stage IV lung cancer, less than 1% of patients
survive to five years.40 Less than one percent. The fact that about 70% of these
patients do not realize that a cure is highly unlikely indicates that a significant
information gap exists between the physician and patient in terms of expected
prognosis.
To be fair to physicians, they may not share the grim reality of the
patient’s prognosis out of a belief that they are helping. Physicians may worry
about burdening their patients with excessively pessimistic information when their
patients already have so much on their plate. This may be why physicians present
fewer facts to patients regarding disease prognosis and EOL care compared with
other types of clinical information.41 Their reluctance to provide survival estimates
has been demonstrated time and time again, and is ironic, given that if the
physicians were terminally ill, they report wanting this information for
themselves. 42 In addition to worrying about encouraging pessimism among
36.
Kadakia et al., supra note 25, at iii29.
37.
Jennifer S. Temel et al., Longitudinal Perceptions of Prognosis and Goals of
Therapy in Patients with Metastatic Non-Small-Cell Lung Cancer: Results of a Randomized
Study of Early Palliative Care, 29 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 2319, 2321 (2011).
38.
Weeks et al., supra note 20, at 1617.
39.
NAT’L CANCER INST., SEER CANCER STATISTICS. REVIEW 1975–2009, at 1–2
(2009),
http://www.seer.cancer.gov/csr/1975_2009_pops09/results_merged/topic_survival.pdf.
40.
Id.
41.
Karen Hancock et al., Truth-Telling in Discussing Prognosis in Advanced
Life-Limiting Illnesses: A Systematic Review, 21 PALLIATIVE MED. 507, 507 (2007)
(“Reasons [for why health professionals avoid discussing prognosis] include . . . fear of
negative impact on the patient . . . .”).
42.
See Christopher K. Daugherty & Fay J. Hlubocky, What Are Terminally Ill
Cancer Patients Told About Their Expected Deaths? A Study of Cancer Physicians’ SelfReports of Prognosis Disclosure, 26 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 5988, 5992 (2008).
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patients, physicians may also worry that they could thwart the patient’s recovery if
the healer is seen to be giving up. The problem is, of course, that while the
physicians are waiting for the patients to signal their interest in an EOL
conversation, the patients are similarly waiting for the physicians to raise these
matters. 43 With no party wanting to take the lead, EOL discussions become an
awkward dance of sorts, where each side expects the other to introduce the topic.44
Consequently, meaningful EOL conversations rarely take place. It is
understandable that everyone involved wants to encourage hope, but they
incorrectly believe that denial is the best way to do so.
We know quite a bit about patients’ understanding of their cancer
prognoses and the care they are receiving. While the context varies, studies have
repeatedly demonstrated that patients are not having necessary conversations about
their EOL goals of care.45 In addition, patients are often mistaken about what their
process of dying will be like, what the rough survival estimates are, and whether
there is a possibility of being cured.46
In 2001, researchers from the Netherlands conducted an observational
study of small-cell lung cancer patients and noticed a recurring phenomenon in
patients that they labeled “false optimism.” 47 This term was used to describe
patients who were significantly more hopeful about their prognosis than their
healthcare providers were, at least when the providers were asked privately. The
team found that false optimism typically developed during the first course of
chemotherapy, and was most common when the cancer could no longer be seen on
X-ray films.48 When the tumor reappeared, optimism waned a bit, but it never fully
went away; it would often reappear to a lesser degree during the later courses of
chemotherapy.49
43.
See Mack & Smith, supra note 30, at 2715 (“Because many patients relied on
physicians to initiate discussions, however, fears for the worst threatened hope when
discussions did not take place.”); see also Keating et al., supra note 26, at 1006.
44.
Mary M. Step & Eileen Berlin Ray, Patient Perceptions of OncologistPatient Communication About Prognosis: Changes from Initial Diagnosis to Cancer
Recurrence, 26 HEALTH COMM. 48, 54 (2011) (“It’s a dance; and she’ll tell me if I ask her,
but I don’t really ask her. I did ask her once and I didn’t like the answer, so I don’t ask her
anymore [laughter].”).
45.
Rachelle E. Bernacki & Susan Block, Communication About Serious Illness
Care Goals: A Review and Synthesis of Best Practices, 174 J. AM. MED. ASS’N INTERNAL
MED. 1994, 1995 (2014).
46.
Approximately one-third of the patients with terminal cancer incorrectly
thought that the treatment would cure them. See Richard N. Eidinger & David V. Schapira,
Cancer Patients’ Insight into Their Treatment, Prognosis, and Unconventional Therapies,
53 CANCER 2736, 2738 (1984) (“These patients with advanced cancer were optimistic when
asked the goal of their treatment program, with 37% of patients thinking it would cure
them . . . .”); see also WJ Mackillop et al., Cancer Patients’ Perceptions of Their Disease
and Its Treatment, 58 BRIT. J. OF CANCER. 355, 355 (1988) (“Sixteen of the 48 patients
being treated palliatively believed that they were being treated with curative intent.”).
47.
Anne-Mei The et al., Collusion in Doctor-Patient Communication About
Imminent Death: An Ethnographic Study, 321 BRIT. MED. J. 1376, 1376–77 (2001).
48.
Id. at 1378.
49.
Id.
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This early study was intriguing. It described how patients could know on
some level that they had cancer, but could still largely ignore their approaching
deaths and remain optimistic. As the patients physically deteriorated and
conversed in waiting rooms with other cancer patients, they learned that they were
dying. 50 But because physicians were so active and aggressive in their treatment
suggestions—and patients complied so enthusiastically with the “recovery plot”—
the patients could “avoid acknowledging explicitly what they should and could
know.”51 Although patients recognized that they were dying, they did not want to
hear their physicians say so. And physicians, trained to heal, did not want to
explain this to their patients.52
A few other studies around this same time demonstrated that terminal
patients were utterly confused about the purpose of their care. One study showed
that 35% of cancer patients believed incorrectly that their purely palliative
radiation was being done to cure their disease.53 Another study showed that one
third of metastatic lung cancer patients mistakenly thought that their palliative
therapy had curative intent.54 This last finding was replicated in a 2011 study of
patients with metastatic nonsmall-cell lung cancer, where one third reported that
their incurable cancer was curable, and a majority suggested that their clinical goal
was “getting rid of all of the cancer.”55 To recap, in four different studies, a third
of terminally ill cancer patients did not understand why they were being given
noxious and potentially debilitating treatments. While the patients thought these
treatments might cure them, the medical team entertained no such hope. Instead,
they pursued these courses to give their patients a few more weeks to live, or to
make them more comfortable.
The false optimism that was shown over a decade ago can still be seen in
cancer patients today. Perhaps they are in denial of their impending deaths, as the
studies above indicate, because physicians are sending them mixed messages that
lure them into thinking they can be cured. By aggressively pursuing new
chemotherapies, devices, and surgeries, physicians and their teams may be
inadvertently sending a message to cancer patients that they can beat the odds. And

50.
Id. (“Gradually patients would find out the facts about their prognosis, partly
because of physical deterioration and partly through contact with fellow patients who were
in a more advanced stage of the illness and were dying.”).
51.
Id. at 1380. (“Initially patients and relatives colluded with doctors in
maintaining a ‘recovery plot’: yesterday the patient was healthy, today he is ill, but
tomorrow he will be better again, thanks to the efforts of the doctor and the patient, with
support of carers. Although all parties individually would have occasional doubts about the
validity of this plot, they would not acknowledge this publicly so as not to be seen as
undermining the others' trust in future recovery.”).
52.
See Robinson et al., supra note 23, at 1056 (“Oncologists made statements of
optimism twice as often as statements of pessimism in the recorded visits, although they
were talking with patients that they would not be surprised if they died within a year.”).
53.
See Edward Chow et al., Patients with Advanced Cancer: A Survey of the
Understanding of Their Illness and Expectations from Palliative Radiotherapy for
Symptomatic Metastases, 13 CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 204, 205 (2001).
54.
Mackillop et al., supra note 46, at 356.
55.
Temel et al., supra note 37, at 2319.
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while obviously some of them can and will, it is nonsensical to say that all patients
can be at the far right-end tail of the bell curve.
Unfortunately, the most recent and thorough study finds the same patient
ignorance regarding prognosis that the older studies found. In a 2012 study of
1,193 advanced cancer patients published in the New England Journal of
Medicine, 69% of those with lung cancer and 81% of patients with colorectal
cancer misunderstood the purpose of their care. Specifically, when each group was
asked how likely they thought chemotherapy was to cure their cancer, the patients
did not understand that the chemotherapy was “not at all likely” to result in a
cure.56 Interestingly, patients were more likely to understand the purpose of the
palliative chemotherapy if they received their care in an integrated network, or if
they rated their physicians as having poor communication skills. 57 This suggests
that physicians who are better at communicating an accurate, though dire,
prognosis may be considered by patients to be “too negative” or “too pessimistic”
in their communication style. 58 The implications for this last finding will be
discussed later.59
When patients do not understand the purpose of their care, they are more
likely to enter phase I clinical trials. 60 While recruiting enough phase I trial
subjects is important to the commercialization of all drugs, cancer patients should
be aware of what they are likely to receive by enrolling. The only purpose of a
phase I trial is to test for toxicity in the drug; the patient is not likely to receive any
clinical benefit.61 Given that phase I trials are meant to gauge the safety of a drug
and not benefit individual subjects it may seem surprising that patients are more
likely to enroll in phase I clinical trials when they are optimistic about their
outcome. Perhaps the reason is that they still see a small window, a chance of
beating the cancer, and the clinical trial provides a means for exploiting this
chance. Many patients confuse clinical trials with clinical care, and assume that
they will receive some therapeutic benefit. This misunderstanding is called the
“therapeutic misconception,” and occurs frequently when a patient signs up to be a

56.
Weeks et al., supra note 20, at 1616–19.
57.
Id. at 1622.
58.
Id. at 1619 (“Patients were less likely to provide inaccurate responses if they
received their care in an integrated network (odds ratio, 0.70; 95% CI, 0.52 to 0.94; P =
0.02) or if they reported lower scores for physician communication, including a score of 80
to 99 versus a score of less than 80 (odds ratio, 1.37; 95% CI, 0.93 to 2.02) and a perfect
score of 100 versus a score of less than 80 (odds ratio, 1.90; 95% CI, 1.33 to 2.72; P = 0.002
for the overall comparison).”).
59.
See infra Part V.
60.
See Robinson et al., supra note 23, at 1050.
61.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., THE DRUG DEVELOPMENT PROCESS: CLINICAL
RESEARCH, http://www.fda.gov/ForPatients/Approvals/Drugs/ucm405622.htm (last updated
June 24, 2015) (“Phase 1 studies are closely monitored and gather information about how a
drug interacts with the human body. Researchers adjust dosing schemes based on animal
data to find out how much of a drug the body can tolerate and what its acute side effects
are.”).
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subject in a trial, confusing their status as patient and subject, and confusing the
role of clinician and researcher.62
They incorrectly assume that the drug has some efficacy, even when the
efficacy has not been demonstrated, and the trial is just gauging the toxicity of the
compound. They might also misunderstand randomization, and assume that their
“doctor” is always wearing his clinical hat, and would never assign them to the
arm of the research where they merely receive placebo. In addition to the
therapeutic misconception, optimistic cancer patients might be more likely to
enroll in phase I clinical trials because they altruistically wanted to give back to the
cancer community. Either way, signing up to test the toxicity of new drugs without
receiving any personal clinical benefit is not a trivial thing. Advanced cancer
patients should be aware that their cancer is incurable before they agree to suffer
the side effects of new, and possibly ineffective, drugs.
Adding to the contours of this portrait, it is not as if oncologists are telling
patients nothing at all. Multiple studies have shown that oncologists usually do talk
to patients about their disease prognoses, and may mention that a particular cancer,
like nonsmall-cell lung cancer, is not curable. 63 Relatedly, at some point in the
patient’s disease progression, virtually all oncologists report that they do inform
their patients that “they will die of their disease.” 64 How then, is there an
information gap?
Even when physicians tell patients that their cancer will kill them, they
usually do so ambiguously or in ways that leave the patients misunderstanding
essential facts. 65 If the patient’s chart merely says that the disclosure of
62.
Gail E. Henderson et al., Clinical Trials and Medical Care: Defining the
Therapeutic Misconception, 4 PUB. LIBR. SCI. MED. 1735, 1735 (2007) (“[M]any trial
participants [are] unaware of study design implications, especially random assignment to a
control or comparison group, often believing that they were assigned a medication based on
what was best for them, personally.”).
63.
The et al., supra note 47, at 1378; see also Melina Gattellari et al., When the
Treatment Goal Is Not Cure: Are Cancer Patients Equipped to Make Informed Decisions?,
20 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 503, 507 (2002) (“The majority of patients were told how
treatment would act on the tumor (85.6%), the aim of treatment (84.7%), and that their
disease was incurable (74.6%).”).
64.
Elizabeth B. Lamont & Nicholas A. Christakis, Prognostic Disclosure to
Patients with Cancer near the End of Life, 134 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 1096, 1096
(2001) (“For 300 of 311 evaluable patients (96.5%), physicians were able to formulate
prognoses. Physicians reported that they would not communicate any survival estimate
22.7% (95% CI, 17.9% to 27.4%) of the time. Of the discrepant survival estimates, most
(70.2%) were optimistically discrepant. Multivariate analysis revealed that older patients
were more likely to receive frank survival estimates, that the most experienced physicians
and the physicians who were least confident about their prognoses were more likely to favor
no disclosure over frank disclosure, and that female physicians were less likely to favor
frank disclosure over pessimistically discrepant disclosure.”).
65.
Anthony L. Back et al., Communication About Cancer near the End of Life,
113 CANCER 1897, 1900 (2008) (“Although physicians generally self-assess their
communication about disclosure favorably, studies of patients show gaps in what physicians
think they convey and what patients actually perceive. In a Canadian study, 98% of
physicians thought they had accurately described the extent of disease to their patients, but
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“incurability” was made on a given date, it does not mean that the patient fully
understood. Our denial of death and optimism bias are both so strong that we may
need to hear this information more than once, and not sandwiched in between the
physician’s optimism regarding the patient’s short-term success with palliative
treatments. If the message is ever mixed, patients will likely choose to remember
the good news rather than the bad.
More to the point for this Article, patients who have overly optimistic
perceptions of their prognosis are also more likely to pursue aggressive surgeries,
chest compressions, tracheotomies, mechanical ventilation, and palliative
chemotherapy. 66 In addition to causing nausea, fatigue, and pain, aggressive
therapies significantly drive up the cost of coverage for both Medicare patients and
the privately insured.67 These treatments also make it much more likely that the
patient will die in the hospital, unable to speak, and connected to multiple
machines. Of course, many would still elect to do everything, even if they
completely understood what these interventions could actually do for them. They
might find it much more reassuring to die from the removal of a ventilator. The
choice of how to proceed at the end of life is undoubtedly a spiritual and personal
one, and must be based on full information about disease prognosis, reasonable
clinical options, and the patient’s values.
C. The Gap Between Physician and Patient Understanding of Prognosis Impairs
EOL Decision-Making
It has been well-documented for over 15 years that a significant gap exists
between what healthcare providers know and what terminal cancer patients
understand about their prognosis and the purpose of their care. 68 I will refer to this
almost [one-]third of patients with metastases thought their disease was localized. Similarly,
although 90% of physicians reported telling the patient the intent of therapy, almost [one]third of patients being treated palliatively thought that their therapy was curative.”).
66.
Matsuyama et al., supra note 23, at 3491 (“Patients who thought they were
going to live for 6 months were 2.6 times as likely to choose aggressive anticancer therapy
instead of palliative care. These patients who received so-called aggressive antineoplastic
treatment had the same survival as those who received other types of care, but were more
likely to have a hospital readmission, undergo attempted resuscitation, or die while
receiving ventilator support.”); see also Temel et al., supra note 37, at 2319 (“Patients with
advanced cancer who have poor illness understanding and overestimate their prognosis are
more likely to choose aggressive medical care at the end of life.”).
67.
See Patricia Bomba, Landmark Legislation in New York Affirms Benefits of a
Two-Step Approach to Advance Care Planning Including MOLST: A Model of Shared,
Informed Medical Decision-Making and Honoring Patient Preferences for Care at the End
of Life, 17 WIDENER L. REV. 475, 485 (2011).
68.
Jane Weeks et al., Relationship Between Cancer Patients' Predictions of
Prognosis and Their Treatment Preferences, 279 JAMA 1709, 1712 (1998) (“Specifically,
patients who believed that they would survive for at least 6 months favored life-extending
therapy over comfort care at more than double the rate of those who believed that there was
at least a small chance (as little as 10%) that they would not live 6 months. This association
was most marked in patients who were optimistic about their probability of surviving 6
months despite physician estimates to the contrary. In addition, we found that patients
greatly overestimated their chances of surviving 6 months, while physician-prognostic
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information asymmetry simply as the “information gap.”69 This information gap
represents fundamental flaws in our current model of informed consent, which
focuses on capturing a patient’s signature as opposed to understanding the
patient’s evolving preferences.
The existence of the information gap is important for three reasons. First,
patients cannot fully participate in their treatment decisions if there is an
information gap. Specifically, patients cannot provide meaningful consent to
particular drugs, procedures, or hospital admissions if they assume that the goal of
these treatments is to cure the cancer when in reality a cure is nearly impossible
and the treatments will only reduce the side effects of the disease. Expecting a cure
skews the benefits of intervention; patients are much more willing to experience
pain, removal from their homes, disability, fatigue, and financial cost if they think
they are waging a war on cancer that they could win.
The second, and related problem with the information gap is that patients
are robbed of the opportunity to get their personal and financial affairs in order. If
they think that they have more time left than they do, patients may avoid the
administrative tasks related to death, including estate planning. When a patient
does pass, their loved ones are left in an incredible bind—where they must
simultaneously grieve, plan a funeral, and divide assets. This burden could be
eased if patients took the initiative and conducted some financial planning before
they got too sick to do so. But of course, patients may need to realize that the end
is near before they will be motivated to engage in this sort of personal and
financial planning.
The third problem with the information gap is perhaps the most
psychologically troubling. When patients misunderstand the goals of their care and
the likelihood of being cured, it suggests that no one has spoken with them frankly
about their impending death. And if this is the case, then the clinical team cannot
possibly know the patients’ desires regarding the dying process itself. Without this
knowledge, the final wishes of the patient will likely not be honored. If the
providers wait until the very end to engage in EOL conversations, the discussions
may be rushed or stressful, or the emotions of the very near death may impair
patients’ ability to engage.
In the event the patient does suddenly crash, this can also put an
unbelievable burden on the surrogate decision-makers, who may be left
speculating what the patient would have wanted done to her body. Should the
feeding tube be inserted? Would she want that? What sorts of risks would she be
willing to endure to potentially gain a few more months? Would she rather be at
home? Does she just want to make it to see the birth of her granddaughter? If there
is no discussion of the dying process, the best that surrogates can do is guess.

estimates were more accurate. Finally, we found that patients who expressed a preference
for life-extending therapy were more likely to undergo aggressive treatment, but controlling
for known prognostic factors, their 6-month survival was no better.”).
69.
More will be said about the empirical support for this phenomenon. See infra
Part III.
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To some readers, it might be shocking that there really is an information
gap. How could advanced cancer patients not know that they are dying? We are all
dying; death is unavoidable. But for terminally ill patients, death can be so drawnout and negotiated that they are coaxed into thinking they can halt it by trying just
one more drug, or undergoing just one more surgery. Thus, despite knowing on
some level that they have cancer, and perhaps even understanding that this will
significantly shorten their lives, advanced cancer patients are quite frequently
holding out hope for a cure. The development and use of so many different cancer
drugs only fuels this fire, as clinicians experiment to see if their particular type of
cancer mutation responds to novel treatments. There is frequently another option
that just might work in this case. This narrative is reinforced by the messages of
hope that are so pervasive in the promotion of cancer hospitals and clinics.
Emboldened with faith in modern medicine, patients pursue risky,
painful, and expensive treatments that they might not pursue if they knew they
were gaining weeks instead of months, or not gaining any time at all. Whatever
their wishes for their death, a substantial number of patients are not given a chance
to articulate them because nobody asks. Instead, metastatic cancer patients are
exposed to third-line experimental chemotherapy treatments, even when the first
and second efforts were unsuccessful. 70 They are operated on within the last days
of life and are placed on ventilators, compelling difficult decisions by family about
whether to “pull the plug.” Not only can these interventions actually hasten death,
but they can also lead to deaths that are more psychologically stressful for patients
and their caretakers, especially if they involve interventions that the patient did not
understand or want.71
Some patients would still wish to “do everything” if they fully
appreciated their prognosis, and when possible, this request should be respected.
However, other patients would choose differently. Instead of receiving painful and
expensive treatments, many patients would likely transition to hospice care. 72
Hospice is a philosophy of care that focuses on the symptoms of one’s disease, and
on prioritizing comfort, compassion, quality of life, and the patient’s autonomy. 73
Hospice treatment often involves administering things like antibiotics, placing
feeding tubes, removing fluids, managing wounds, or giving pain medications. It
70.
Third-line therapy is the use of chemotherapy for a third time, often with the
third treatment being considered less effective than the “first-line” or “second-line” options.
See Nick Thatcher et al., Gefitinib Plus Best Supportive Care in Previously Treated Patients
with Refractory Advanced Non-Small-Cell Lung Cancer: Results from a Randomised,
Placebo-Controlled, Multicentre Study (Iressa Survival Evaluation in Lung Cancer), 366
LANCET 1527, 1533 (2005).
71.
Buiting et al., supra note 22, at 4; Maarten Hofman et al., Cancer Patients’
Expectations of Experiencing Treatment-Related Side Effects: A University of Rochester
Cancer Center—Community Clinical Oncology Program Study of 938 Patients from
Community Practices, 101 CANCER 851, 851–57 (2004).
72.
See Ziad Obermeyer et al., Association Between the Medicare Hospice
Benefit and Health Care Utilization and Costs for Patients with Poor-Prognosis Cancer,
312 JAMA 1888, 1889 (2014).
73.
What
Is
Hospice?
HOSPICE
FOUND.
OF
AM.,
http://hospicefoundation.org/End-of-Life-Support-and-Resources/Coping-with-TerminalIllness/Hospice-Services (last visited Oct. 30, 2015) [hereinafter What Is Hospice?].
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usually does not involve intensive procedures such as chemotherapy, cardio
resuscitation (“CPR”), or mechanical ventilation. Hospice represents an alternative
to the invasive and heroic measures of research hospitals and ICUs. In its many
forms, hospice can also provide assistance to the patients’ caregivers and families
to help them cope with their loved one’s death, and to provide nursing support if
the patient wants to remain at home.
Regrettably, due to many misconceptions about hospice care, hospice
suffers from an unjustified stigma. Many people think that hospice care accelerates
death, because patients are “giving up.” With hospice, there are usually no ICU
visits or hospital interventions, 74 and patients are given powerful narcotics to
combat pain. But astonishingly, hospice does not actually hasten death for cancer
patients. A study of roughly 4,500 Medicare patients found that for some
conditions, hospice care seemed to extend survival. 75 Patients with pancreatic
cancer gained an average of three weeks, those with lung cancer gained six weeks,
and those with congestive heart failure gained three months. According to Atul
Gawande’s take on this research: “The lesson seems almost zen—you live longer
only when you stop trying to live longer.”76
The use of hospice has increased in the United States in the last two
decades, but still remains relatively low, and the average length of hospice stays
has decreased.77 More terminally ill patients would choose hospice if they were
given a forthright account of the progress of their disease. 78 This would allow
some to say goodbye to loved ones on their own terms. More patients would be
able to die at home, which is where the large majority of Americans say that they
would prefer to die.79
74.
In July of 2015, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”)
announced that a select number of pilot hospices would be able to introduce the new
“Medicare Care Choices Model.” This model provides Medicare beneficiaries who qualify
for the Medicare hospice benefit and dually eligible beneficiaries who qualify for the
Medicaid hospice benefit the option of receiving palliative care as well as some curative
services. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., CMS Announces
Medicare
Care
Choices
Model
Awards
(July
20,
2015),
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2015pres/07/20150720a.html.
75.
Stephen R. Connor et al., Comparing Hospice and Nonhospice Patient
Survival Among Patients Who Die within a Three-Year Window, 33 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM
MGMT. 238, 242–43 (2007).
76.
GAWANDE, supra note 12, at 178–79.
77.
Obermeyer et al., supra note 72, at 1889.
78.
Id. at 1895 (“[T]hose receiving hospice care, compared with matched control
patients not receiving hospice care, had significantly lower rates of hospitalization, intensive
care unit admission, and invasive procedures at the end of life, along with significantly
lower health care expenditures during the last year of life.”).
79.
I.J. Higginson & G.J.A. Sen-Gupta, Place of Care in Advanced Cancer: A
Qualitative Systematic Literature Review of Patient Preferences, 3 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 287,
297 (2000); see also Nancy E. Morden et al., End-of-Life Care for Medicare Beneficiaries
with Cancer Is Highly Intensive Overall and Varies Widely, 31 HEALTH AFF. 786, 786
(2012) (“When confronted with such poor survival chances [dying in one year] in the face
of cancer and other illness, the average patient prefers to spend as much time as possible in
a home-like setting with good control of pain and other symptoms.”).
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To be abundantly clear, hope is not the enemy. Hope energizes us and it
reminds us why we live. The mere presence of optimism or hope in terminal
cancer care is not the concern of this Article. This Article also makes no claim
about how individuals ought to value an incremental extension of their life at the
end of life.80 Rather, this Article is concerned with the unique way the legal system
encourages the denial of death in terminally ill cancer patients—a pursuit that is
expensive and psychologically harmful.81
D. Why Physicians Do Not Initiate Prognosis-Related EOL Conversations
Several studies have been conducted regarding physicians’
communication with terminally ill lung cancer patients. In one study, 20% of
respondents (n=276) reported that their physicians communicated “not at all” or “a
little bit” about symptoms, spiritual concerns, practical needs, proxy appointment,
living will preparation, prognosis, care goals, and potential complications of
treatment.82 Disclosing a poor prognosis may conflict with the clinician’s sense of
obligation to communicate in a way that leaves room for hope. 83 In this way,
physicians and nurses may be withholding prognostic information with the
paternalistic belief that they are actually helping. This explains why nearly half of
patients report that their physician communication always made them feel
hopeful.84
1. Executing a Living Will Is the Beginning of the Conversation, Not the End
Regardless of whether the reason is charitable, in 2015 it is unethical for a
physician to fail to examine how much a patient wants to know, and if the patient
seeks to be fully informed, it is similarly unethical to fail to discuss the patient’s
disease and treatment prognosis with her—no matter how grim. There are many
avenues for introducing the topic of EOL care. One way is to suggest that the
patient complete an advance directive (otherwise known as a “living will”). An
advance directive can take the form of appointing a surrogate decision-maker to
make certain healthcare decisions in the event one loses medical decision-making

80.
A recent article detailed the various psychological factors that might explain
how terminally ill people value life at the end of life. Paul T. Menzel, The Value of Life at
the End of Life: A Critical Assessment of Hope and Other Factors, 39 J. L. MED. & ETHICS
215 (2011). This article does not suggest that there is one subjectively or normatively
correct way to value life. Rather, it encourages the patient to work this out in a way that is
concordant with her values, but with the requirement that this evaluation be fully informed
and not the result of confusion or ignorance. See id. at 217.
81.
While some have argued “it would be inaccurate to describe hope as ‘false’
when the available evidence suggests that it consistently contributes to greater productivity
and well-being in various life arenas,” in this Article I argue that encouraging false hope is
always unduly harmful if it rests on the patient’s ignorance to her disease prognosis. See
C.R. Snyder et al., “False” Hope, 58 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 1017 (2002).
82.
Judith E. Nelson et al., Patients Rate Physician Communication About Lung
Cancer, 117 CANCER 5212, 5214–15 (2011).
83.
Mack et al., supra note 33, at 5636.
84.
See id. at 5640 (“[T]he relationship between hope and disclosure could be
explained by the disclosure of overly optimistic prognoses to parents.”).
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capacity. Alternatively, an advance directive can also instruct physicians as to
specific types of care that a patient may or may not want.
Federal law requires healthcare institutions to provide adult patients with
information about how to complete an advance directive when patients are
admitted to the facility.85 Each state, however, has different legal requirements for
enforcing advance directives, making them confusing for patients to complete. In
addition, the terms of an advance directive are not easy to interpret once a patient
lacks medical decision-making capacity. In many cases, patients are given a form
to sign, and no one consults with the patient after completing the form to make
sure their selections make sense. For example, patients may select the box saying
that should they crash, they want to be “DNR” (do not resuscitate). But patients
may also elect to be ventilated and receive tube feedings—two procedures that are
typically not indicated when a patient prefers not to be resuscitated. Furthermore,
the form itself may not wind up in the patient’s medical record, or in the
emergency department when there is a crisis. Finally, many patients are reluctant
to complete the form out of a fear that it may set their present intentions in stone,
or out of a general fear of death. 86 This reluctance may be overcome when patients
hear “personal stories of others who have had to make EOL decisions for a loved
one without any guidance, [as] the desire to save their family from these painful
experiences can become a prime motivator for putting their own wishes in
writing.”87 Despite the shortcomings of relying on advance directives exclusively,
requiring patients to complete an advance directive can initiate conversations about
patient preferences at the end of life. This is an important first step that should be
the beginning of the conversation, not the end.
2. The Timing of EOL Conversations Is Often Inopportune
In addition to the formal process of completing an advance directive,
providers must take the time to discuss EOL goals of care with their patients. Once
physicians have determined that a patient is terminal, this conversation should take
place multiple times throughout the course of the patient’s subsequent treatment.
Alas, telling a patient that she is near death, and then offering to discuss her EOL
care, is easier said than done. There are multiple reasons why thorough EOL
conversations rarely take place. A major reason is that physicians are busy. Given
everything that they are expected to accomplish in the short amount of time that
they have with patients, it may be impractical to ask them to spend more time
discussing EOL care. The current fee-for-service reimbursement climate makes
this even more improbable. Physicians get paid to do things to patients, not to talk
85.
The Patient Self-Determination Act (“PSDA”) was passed by Congress in
1990 as an amendment to the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990. Pub. L. No.
101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
86.
See INST. OF MED., DYING IN AMERICA: IMPROVING QUALITY AND HONORING
INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCE NEAR THE END OF LIFE 117–18 (2015) (observing that patients who
have a greater fear of death are significantly less likely to complete a form).
87.
Id. at 126 (citing S.D. Halpern, Shaping End-of-Life Care: Behavioral
Economics and Advance Directives, 33 SEMINARS IN RESPIRATORY AND CRITICAL CARE
MED. 393 (2012); K.E. Steinhauser et al., Factors Considered Important at the End of Life
by Patients, Families, Physicians, and Other Care Providers, 284 JAMA 2476 (2000)).
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about why or whether to do these things. More will be said about this important
factor later.88
To highlight how short the initial conversations about prognosis typically
are, a 2010 study of 437 patients found that nearly half (44%) remember being
given their cancer diagnosis during a conversation that lasted no longer than ten
minutes, with 8% saying that the initial discussion of diagnosis lasted less than one
minute. 89 Moreover, almost a fifth of the patients (18%) were told about their
diagnosis over the phone.90 Of course, an EOL conversation should be thought of
as an ongoing dialogue, and not a one-time event that occurs at diagnosis. Indeed,
it may be better for physicians to discuss prognosis during a later conversation,
after the patient has had some time to reflect on their new reality. Even so, a
critical opportunity for discussing typical disease trajectories is missed if the initial
conversation is impersonal or rushed. 91 And a brief or impersonal initial
conversation about diagnosis might set the wrong tone for the future doctor–
patient relationship, one in which the patient assumes that the role of the doctor
will be to provide information, and the role of the patient will be to listen.
Even after diagnosis, patients are not being told enough about their EOL
options. This means that, while some oncologists may be doing all that they can to
ensure their patients die the way they want to die, most are not doing nearly
enough. Prognosis disclosures range from the simple oral communication of a
diagnosis, to a description of anticipated symptoms, to a written time estimate of
disease or symptom progression.92 The timing of this disclosure also varies, often
coming too late. 93 In one study, only about two-thirds of physicians discussed
disease prognosis on the first visit, when the cancer diagnosis was made.94 Fifteen
percent of physicians reported that they would have an EOL discussion only if the
88.
See infra Section I.D.7.
89.
William D. Figg et al., Disclosing a Diagnosis of Cancer: Where and How
Does It Occur?, 28 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 3630, 3632 (2010). Their memories might overor underestimate the actual time that was spent. This study has been criticized because the
researchers did not provide the actual questionnaire in the appendix.
90.
Id. at 3633.
91.
In this first encounter, the physician should make sure the room is private
and comfortable, the diagnosis is delivered in person and with competence, and the patient
has adequate time to ask questions. See Francesca C. Dwamena et al., Breaking Bad News:
A Patient-Centered Approach to Delivering an Unexpected Cancer Diagnosis, 11 SEMINARS
IN MED. PRAC. 11, 14 (2008); see also Patricia A. Parker et al., Breaking Bad News About
Cancer: Patients’ Preferences for Communication, 19 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 2049, 2054
(2001).
92.
Kadakia et al., supra note 25, at iii29.
93.
See Jennifer W. Mack et al., Associations Between End-of-Life Discussion
Characteristics and Care Received near Death: A Prospective Cohort Study, 30 J. Clinical
Oncology 4387, 4394 (2012) (“One path is characterized by early discussion about EOL
care, greater use of hospice care including early hospice initiation, and less use of
aggressive care. The alternative path features EOL discussions that start in the last 30 days
of life (or never take place), accompanied by aggressive care in the last month and less and
later hospice initiation.”).
94.
Keating et al., supra note 26, at 1000 (“Overall, 65% of physicians would
discuss prognosis [when the victim is first diagnosed].”).
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patient or her family initiated it. 95 In this same study, about one-quarter of
physicians said they would wait until they have exhausted all treatment options
before discussing the patient’s code status 96 with them. 97 This defers the EOL
discussion until it is woefully too late, and can create a very desperate and
pessimistic tone when it finally does take place. 98 It would be much better to
discuss the patient’s values and EOL goals of care periodically and in light of new
clinical information, rather than waiting until the doctor has decided that there is
nothing more that can be done.
3. Physicians Are Uncomfortable Prognosticating
At this point, any healthcare provider reading this will say that there is an
explanation for their uneasiness in delivering direct EOL prognoses. Their defense
goes like this: Disease survival estimates are notoriously incorrect. Physicians,
knowing this from their own humbled experience of being wrong, resist giving
patients overly objective estimates.99
To be fair, the data show that physicians are often wrong in their survival
estimates. A meta-review of eight different studies showed that physicians’
predictions were “poor.” 100 However, this was not because physicians’ life
expectancy estimates were all over the map. Instead, it was because the estimates
were usually too optimistic, with physicians overestimating survival time in
roughly 80% of cases. 101 Still, in this meta-review, while the estimates were
usually rosy, the predictions were still not that far off. Physicians predicted a
median survival of 42 days and the median actual survival was 29 days. 102
Unfortunately, this does not appear to be remedied by getting to know patients
personally, as the doctors who knew their patients better were even more likely to
overestimate survival time.103 This suggests that as the physicians became more
personally invested in seeing their patient survive, physicians themselves were
more likely to experience a false sense of hope.

95.
Id.
96.
Code status refers to whether the patient would want to be resuscitated
should she go into cardiac arrest. See id. at 1001.
97.
Keating et al., supra note 26, at 1003.
98.
See Wentlandt et al., Preparation for the End of Life in Patients with
Advanced Cancer and Association with Communication with Professional Caregivers, 21
PSYCHO-ONCOLOGY 868, 874 (2011).
99.
See Hancock et al., supra note 41, at 511.
100.
Marija Trajkovic-Vidakovic et al., Symptoms Tell It All: A Systematic Review
of the Value of Symptom Assessment to Predict Survival in Advanced Cancer Patients, 84
CRITICAL REVS. IN ONCOLOGY/HEMATOLOGY 130, 137 (2012).
101.
See Elizabeth B. Lamont & Nicholas A. Christakis, Complexities in
Prognostication in Advanced Cancer: “To Help Them Live Their Lives the Way They Want
to,” 290 JAMA 98, 99 (2003) (“[I]n this vignette, Dr D substantially underestimated Ms
M’s survival, an event which has been shown to occur in less than 20% of patients.”).
102.
Paul Glare et al., A Systematic Review of Physicians’ Survival Predictions in
Terminally Ill Cancer Patients, 327 BRIT. MED. J. 195, 196 (2003).
103.
GAWANDE, supra note 12, at 167.
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Even when patients press their physicians to give them specific survival
estimates, many physicians resist doing so. As Atul Gawande notes:
More than 40 percent of oncologists admit to offering treatments
that they believe are unlikely to work. In an era in which the
relationship between patient and doctor is increasingly miscast in
retail terms—‘the customer is always right’—doctors are
especially hesitant to trample on a patient’s expectations. You
worry far more about being overly pessimistic than you do about
being overly optimistic.104
Stunningly, it has also been shown that the youngest patients with the
poorest prognoses are the least likely to get an honest prognosis. 105 Physicians
“give the least honest figures to those with the worst prognoses (and perhaps most
in need of information to make decisions).”106 One study found that when patients
who were referred to hospice explicitly asked about their prognosis, physicians
provided an honest estimate only 37% of the time. 107 Typically, they would
provide no estimate or a conscious overestimate of survival time to these terminal
patients.108 Another study showed that physicians could mitigate this information
gap if they removed overly positive qualitative statements from their conversations
with patients or gave one negative fact about the patient’s prognosis.109
To improve disease prognosis, physicians and nurses need more
communication training in how to convey bad news. In one study, 58% percent of
surveyed physicians said that they had no formal education in delivering negative
prognoses or discussing EOL options. 110 Given how tight their time is with
patients, their insecurity in delivering bad news, and perhaps their own fear of
mortality, it is no wonder physicians do not prioritize communicating unpleasant
prognoses.
One way of signaling that the goals of care are palliative rather than
therapeutic is to say, “[t]he goal is for you to do as well as possible for as long as
possible.” 111 Experts recognize that this statement may be difficult to comprehend,
so they recommend separating it into more digestible goals. The physician may
therefore say that her treatment goals are to have: “(1) the fewest side effects as
possible from the cancer, (2) the fewest side effects as possible from the treatment,
(3) the best quality of life, and (4) the longest life. These simpler concepts are
more understandable.”112

104.
Id. at 167–68.
105.
Keating et al., supra note 26, at 998–1006.
106.
Mack & Smith, supra note 30, at 2716.
107.
Id. (citing Nicholas A. Christakis & Elizabeth B. Lamont, Extent and
Determinants of Error in Doctor’s Prognoses in Terminally Ill Patients: Prospective Cohort
Study, 320 BRIT. MED. J. 469 (2000)).
108.
Id. (citing Robinson et al., supra note 23, at 1049–57).
109.
Id. (citing Robinson et al., supra note 23, at 1049–57).
110.
Daugherty & Hlubocky, supra note 42, at 5990.
111.
Kadakia et al., supra note 25, at iii29.
112.
Id. at iii30.
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At present, providers are not well prepared psychologically to answer the
tough question: “Doctor, how long do I have?”113 Providers resist putting a fixed
number on the predicted survival time, or having an EOL discussion generally,
because they not only want to encourage hope but also lack training in responding
to a patient’s emotions or fears. In two studies, “stress” was cited as a major factor
inhibiting a physician’s full prognostic disclosure.114 A majority of doctors from
various countries reported “it was stressful to deal with their patients’ families,
respond to their patients’ emotions, to be honest without depressing their patients
and to handle their own negative feelings . . . .”115
Prognostic models exist to aid physicians along the way—though many
clinicians find them to be cumbersome and inaccurate. 116 While some models are
more accurate than others, predictions of life expectancy are more accurate—and
less misleading to patients—when expressed in probabilistic terms, rather than
absolute values.117 And even though probabilities may be more accurate, making
an inference from group data—e.g., lung cancer patients (generally) to the
individual (this patient)—can be tricky.
To aid in providing inferences from groups to individuals, researchers and
clinicians must collect and publish more precise population data regarding
predicted versus actual survival times. These studies must stratify patients by
factors such as age, the potential genetic contributions to their cancer, their
individual symptoms, tumor burden, or immune function. This will assist
physicians in contextualizing disease prognoses by tailoring the group information
to account for individual differences. It will also go a long way to help patients
comprehend the probabilistic figures, a task at which we humans are notoriously
weak.118 Some of these studies have already been done.119
113.
Paul A. Glare & Christian T. Sinclair, Palliative Medicine Review:
Prognostication, 11 J. OF PALLIATIVE MED. 84, 84 (2008) (“Despite this crucial role,
expertise in the art and science of prognostication diminished during the twentieth century,
due largely to the ascendancy of accurate diagnostic tests and effective therapies.
Consequently, ‘[d]octor, how long do I have?’ is a question most physicians find
unprepared to answer effectively. As we focus on palliative care in the twenty-first century,
prognostication will need to be restored as a core clinical proficiency.”).
114.
Hancock et al., supra note 41, at 510 (citing Walter F. Baile et al.,
Oncologists’ Attitudes Toward and Practices in Giving Bad News: An Exploratory Study,
20 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 2189 (2002); Nicholas A. Christakis & Theodore J. Iwashyna,
Attitude and Self-Reported Practice Regarding Prognostication in a National Sample of
Internists, 158 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2389 (1998)).
115.
Hancock et al., supra note 41, at 510.
116.
David Hui et al., The Accuracy of Probabilistic Versus Temporal Clinician
Prediction of Survival for Patients with Advanced Cancer: A Preliminary Report, 16
ONCOLOGIST 1642, 1643 (2011).
117.
Physicians were more accurate in estimating life expectancy when their
answers took the form of “the approximate probability that this patient will be alive . . . in
[x] hours, days, weeks, months is [y]%” rather than when they attempted to give an
approximate number for the survival time for this particular patient. See id. at 1646–47.
118.
Adrian Edwards et al., Explaining Risks: Turning Numerical Data into
Meaningful Pictures, 324 BRIT. MED. J. 827, 827 (2002) (“Terms such as probable, unlikely,
rare, and so on have been shown to convey ‘elastic’ concepts. One person’s understanding
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In the meantime, even if a physician does not have specific and accurate
predictors of probable disease prognosis, she can better serve patients by telling
them whether it is likely they will fall into the “worst case,” “normal,” or “best
case” survival estimates. These classifications for some types of cancer can be
determined based on deriving multiples of an overall survival curve’s median, with
estimates of “worst-case” being one quarter of the median survival time, “typical”
being half to double the median, and “best-case” life expectancy being triple the
median.120 While still far from perfect, classifying patients into these probabilistic
groups can, at the very least, help patients determine whether to start
chemotherapy or pursue risky and expensive interventions.
The general belief that physicians are poor prognosticators offers a
plausible cover. Under this cover, physicians can, and do, refuse to offer specific
estimates of survival time. Instead of being seen as paternalistic, their withholding
is somehow justified by their humble ineptitude and lack of data. It can also be
justified on the basis that patients will struggle to understand the probabilistic data.
However, we should not let the perfect prediction be the enemy of the good that
comes from open discussion, given all that is riding on these estimates. Even if
some patients misunderstand or deny the facts that are given to them, it does not
mean that physicians should stop providing everyone with reasonable estimates.
Compassion, or imperfect reception, should not translate into the withholding of
critical information. Rather, the information must be qualified as an estimate, a
likelihood, but not the product of a perfect crystal ball.
While physicians are uncomfortable telling patients how much time they
have left, they are often much more comfortable estimating treatment prognosis.
Compared to disease prognosis, which assesses the overall goals of care for the
disease, treatment prognosis involves the physician providing information on the
outcome of particular treatments, such as a chemotherapy drug, a tumor resection,
of ‘likely’ may be a chance of 1 in 10, whereas another may think that it means a chance of
1 in 2 . . . . Interpretation of numerical information is problematic. For example, [one
research team] found that death rates of 1,286 out of 10,000 were rated as more risky than
rates of 24.14 out of 100. In addition, the interpretation of the probabilistic elements of risk
cannot be divorced from the importance of the harm, which includes the meaning of the
harm and its implications for lifestyle and health (such as the threat of cancer).”); see also
Lisa G. Aspinwall, Persuasion for the Purpose of Cancer Risk Reduction: Understanding
Responses to Risk Communications, 1999 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. MONOGRAPHS 88, 88 (“A
pressing need exists to understand how people process risk information over time and how
such processing may differ as a function of risk status, individual differences, social
context, and other factors.”).
119.
Rachel Ballard-Barbash et al., Physical Activity, Biomarkers, and Disease
Outcomes in Cancer Survivors: A Systematic Review, 104 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 815
(2012); see also Patricia González-Arriaga et al., Genetic Polymorphisms in MMP 2, 9 and
3 Genes Modify Lung Cancer Risk and Survival, 12 BMC CANCER 121 (2012); Ya-Hsuan
Chang et al., Pathway-Based Gene Signatures Predicting Clinical Outcome of Lung
Adenocarcinoma, 5 SCI. REPS. 1 (2015).
120.
Barry E. Kiely et al., Estimating Typical, Best-Case and Worst-Case Life
Expectancy Scenarios for Patients Starting Chemotherapy for Advanced Non-Small-Cell
Lung Cancer: A Systematic Review of Contemporary Randomized Trials, 77 LUNG CANCER
537, 537–38 (2012).
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or a series of radiation.121 These predictions usually involve a shorter time span
and are easier to estimate. As Gawande put it in his book, Being Mortal, “[w]ords
like ‘respond’ and ‘long-term’ provide a reassuring gloss on a dire reality.”122 If
the physician does not feel confident asserting the likely benefits of a particular
chemotherapy regimen, then the treatment should not be offered in the first place.
Most cancer treatments come with a nontrivial amount of risk, and when
conducting a cost-benefit analysis, an unknown on the benefit side will likely be
overpowered by the risk. The American Society of Clinical Oncology strongly
recommends that treatments have a definable benefit before they are suggested to
patients.123 If possible, physicians should provide the mean response time or mean
improvement in stabilizing the disease (not in curing, but in slowing down cancer
progression) as part of the informed consent process to treatment.
In many cases, the treatment will offer some short-term benefit by
reducing the tumor load, improving the airway and breathing, or reducing
discomfort. By switching from a focus on the overall disease prognosis to a focus
on the prognosis of an isolated treatment, physicians are capable of dodging the
EOL discussion and instead offering a glimmer of hope. Individual treatments
might be successful without having any positive impact on life expectancy.
Unfortunately, because physicians are more likely to share treatment information
when it is optimistic, patients can confuse treatment prognosis with disease
prognosis.124 This can lead patients to focus on the positive results from palliative
therapy, ignoring the fact that the underlying disease prognosis is still incredibly
grim, and the survival estimate has not changed. Because of this, physicians should
make it clear when they are providing treatment prognosis to patients, as compared
to underlying disease prognosis.
4. EOL Conversations Are Increasingly Just About “Consenting” Patients
Engaging in effective EOL discussions is difficult, but not impossible. It
takes time, patience, and, importantly, training. According to Susan Block, a
renowned palliative care physician, physicians err when they dismiss EOL
conversations as requiring less thought or training than surgical procedures. As she
puts it, “a family meeting is a procedure, and it requires no less skill than
performing an operation.”125
In my experience on hospital ethics committees and attending resident
conferences, physicians often treat EOL conversations as an opportunity to have
patients “consent” to being classified as DNR. The family meeting is successful if
the team comes away with an order that they can place in the patient’s chart,
stating that the patient would not want chest compressions or resuscitation. If the
121.
See, e.g., Weeks et al., supra note 20 (showing that many patients receiving
chemotherapy for incurable cancers did not understand that chemotherapy would not be
curative for their conditions and concluding that physicians could provide patients with
more accurate information regarding the treatment efficacy—at the cost of the patients’
satisfaction rating).
122.
GAWANDE, supra note 12, at 151.
123.
Kadakia et al., supra note 25, at iii30.
124.
Matsuyama et al., supra note 23, at 3490.
125.
GAWANDE, supra note 12, at 181.
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patient crashes, they will be treated only with comfort care and no heroic
interventions will be performed. If the aims of the family meeting are not actually
this sinister, then they still seem focused on determining whether a patient wants a
particular procedure. When physicians focus only on the risks and benefits of
particular procedures, and on the goal of “consenting” patients, they ignore their
role as interpreters of the risk/benefit data. While the law still requires physicians
to let patients decide whether to consent to care, patients often want physicians to
put the data into context, to let them know what the physician would do, what the
physician’s concerns are, and how this relates to the patient’s individual case.
Susan Block believes that a critical component of EOL conversations is:
[H]elping people negotiate the overwhelming anxiety—anxiety
about death, anxiety about suffering, anxiety about loved ones,
anxiety about finances . . . [and] no one conversation can address
them all. Arriving at an acceptance of one’s mortality and a clear
understanding of the limits and the possibilities of medicine is a
process, not an epiphany.126
Adopting this perspective is crucial for physicians to realize that EOL
conversations evolve, and cannot be reduced to a legalistic form. These
conversations must begin with clinicians asking patients open-ended questions
about what they want their death to be like, what they value, and then revisiting
how their values impact their treatment preferences as the disease takes its course.
For example, in some parts of East Asia, it still remains common to keep
the diagnosis of cancer from the patient. 127 The word—”cancer”—is considered
taboo, and so it is seldom uttered in a patient’s presence.128 While the patient may
understand that she is sick, there is plausible deniability as to the cause of the
illness. In the United States and most of the Western world, however, this is not
the case. It is no longer a legal or ethical question of whether to tell competent
patients about the fact that they have cancer but how best to do so.129
All state tort laws are interpreted in ways that require the patient to
participate and consent to her care, either personally, or through the channeling of
her choices through a surrogate.130 If medical intervention is not consented to, the
126.
Id. at 181–82.
127.
See Mitsuru Seo et al., Telling the Diagnosis to Cancer Patients in Japan:
Attitude and Perception of Patients, Physicians and Nurses, 14 PALLIATIVE MED. 105
(2000); Angel Lee & H.Y. Wu, Diagnosis Disclosure in Cancer Patients—When the Family
Says “No!,” 43 SING. MED. J. 533 (2002); see also Ruhnke et al., supra note 13 (observing
that in Japan, 80% of physicians and 65% of patients believed that the patient’s family
should be told of a cancer diagnosis first, and then they should decide whether to tell the
patient).
128.
Seo et al., supra note 127; Lee & Wu, supra note 127.
129.
William Figg et al., Disclosing a Diagnosis of Cancer: Where and How Does
It Occur? 28 J. CLINICAL. ONCOLOGY 3630, 3630 (2010); see also Rebecca Hagerty et al.,
Communicating with Realism and Hope: Incurable Cancer Patients Views on the
Disclosure of Prognosis, 23 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 1278, 1278 (2005).
130.
“A patient must consent before a physician renders medical treatment of any
kind.” 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, Etc. § 148 (2015).
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clinician has committed a form of negligence, which is a breach of the medical
standard of care.131 In order to fulfill her legal duties, the physician must therefore
disclose both the diagnosis and its prognosis to the patient. While legal norms for
sharing disease diagnosis have coalesced around patient autonomy and full
disclosure in the United States, the methods of disclosing prognosis have often
stagnated in the world of “doctor knows best.”
Treating informed consent as a legal document that must be signed, rather
than a process of understanding patient preferences, has led to physicians ignoring
the enormous skill that is required in these conversations. Rather than seeing
informed consent as a purely legal requirement, physicians need to be made aware
of the ethical importance of discussing both clinical risks and benefits as well as
patient values. The problems of obtaining meaningful informed consent are only
compounded in the context of EOL conversations, where physicians have
additional reasons for avoiding frank conversations about patient values.
5. Informed Consent Does Not Incentivize Physicians to Have Meaningful EOL
Conversations
Unfortunately, we cannot expect the common law of informed consent to
solve this matter for us. The tort model of informed consent typically focuses not
on the patient in front of the physician, but on what a “prudent patient” would want
to know.132 A physician can only be held to have breached his legal duty if the
undisclosed information is of a type that would be material ex ante to the objective
prudent patient. 133 This legal standard is pretty helpful at countering the
paternalistic 1950s model of “doctor knows best.” 134 It works well when the
patient is basically healthy and is contemplating an isolated treatment. However,
when we are discussing something as idiosyncratic and spiritual as how one
chooses to die, it seems vulgar to impose a “prudent patient” standard on this
necessarily highly subjective decision.
131.
Laurent B. Frantz, Annotation, Modern Status of Views as to General
Measure of Physician’s Duty to Inform Patient of Risks of Proposed Treatment, 88 A.L.R.
3d 1008 (2015).
132.
In a majority of jurisdictions, to establish a cause of action to recover
damages for malpractice based on lack of informed consent, a plaintiff must prove that a
reasonably prudent patient in the same position would not have undergone the treatment if
she had been fully informed. See Beth Holliday, Annotation, Cause of Action Against
Physician for Failure to Obtain Patient’s Informed Consent, 49 Causes of Action 2d 573, §
22 (2015). In a few jurisdictions, the court is allowed to look subjectively at whether this
particular patient would have consented. Id. at § 23.
133.
See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786–87 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(discussing the “prudent person in the patient’s position” standard).
134.
See Nathan A. Kottkamp, Finding Clarity in a Gray Opinion: A Critique of
Pennsylvania’s Informed Consent Doctrine, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 241, 278–79 (1999) (citing
Lynne Heckert, Comment, Informed Consent in Pennsylvania—the Need for a Negligence
Standard, 28 VILL. L. REV. 149, 158 (1982–1983)) (“[The] ancient conceit of the medical
profession [was] that ‘the doctor knows best’ and that patients are people of low
intelligence, who cannot possibly understand the complexities involved in medical decision
making, and ought not to be given a say about treatment even when it involves the patient’s
own body.”).
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A particularly striking example of the failure of the law’s informed
consent model to address EOL care comes from the 1993 California case Arato v.
Avendon.135 In Arato, the patient died of pancreatic cancer, but only after he had
consented to and underwent a painful and experimental chemotherapy treatment
that proved ineffective. His family filed an informed consent claim, and argued
that the physicians should have disclosed his grim life expectancy to him; they say
he would have rejected the chemotherapy treatment, and instead spent time with
his family and ordered his financial affairs. In declining to hold that, as a matter of
law, physicians owe a duty to disclose life expectancy data, the court bungled the
informed consent doctrine.136
First, the court dismissed the importance of probabilistic life expectancy
data, but its reasoning proves too much. 137 The opinion states that “statistical
morbidity values derived from the experience of population groups are inherently
unreliable and offer little assurance regarding the fate of the individual patient.”138
While it is certainly true that drawing inferences from group data to individual
cases is imprecise, this is true of all risk data. All data—for instance, mortality
risk, risk of infection, risk of losing a limb, and risk of blindness—are
probabilistic. We cannot know with any positive predictive value whether a
particular patient will experience these side effects. If we truly felt that group risk
data are “too unreliable” to be material to an individual prudent patient, then we
are gutting the entire basis of informed consent doctrine, and might as well do
away with it entirely.
Second, the court argued that there could be no duty for physicians to
disclose information that is relevant to a patient’s nonmedical interests, such as her
desire to plan her finances. 139 This is also an obfuscation of informed consent
doctrine. A patient might want to know about the risk of losing her arm in a
surgery because she is a concert pianist or painter, or because the out-of-pocket
costs of the procedure might be too high to justify that risk to her body. Any of
these reasons for her decision are protected by the doctrine of informed consent.
The law would not be protecting autonomy if it held that patients had to use the
material clinical information in specified, pre-determined ways.
Importantly, the Arato court did not say that life-expectancy statistics are
never material to a patient’s decision. Rather, the court correctly argued that it
should be up to the jury to decide what information is material in any patient’s
case, given the context. 140 Unfortunately, the very nature of after-the-fact tort
litigation means that the violation of the patient’s autonomy has already occurred.
The remedy is imperfect and cannot change the way the individual died. There is

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

858 P.2d 598, 605–07 (Cal. 1993).
Id. at 599–600.
Id. at 607.
Id.
Id. at 609.
Id. at 607.
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also considerable literature demonstrating how ineffective tort law is at deterring
proscribed behavior.141
Together, these points illustrate why we cannot rely on informed consent
doctrine to solve our dilemma. The reliance on objective standards of care and
what a “prudent patient” would find material conflicts with the idea that patients
need not be prudent, reasonable, or overly cognitive about their EOL decisions.
There must be room for emotions, spirituality, and idiosyncratic values; therefore,
tort law will not prompt meaningful EOL conversations.
6. Physicians Mistakenly Believe that Medical Malpractice Is Just About the
Failure to Provide Care
While unlikely to be a conscious factor, physicians also collude in the
denial of death because they prefer not to be sued. 142 To avoid litigation, they
could justify performing unnecessary or futile care at the end of life out of an
unjustified fear that a dissatisfied patient may file a medical malpractice claim.
However, as the Institute of Medicine’s 2014 report Dying in America pointed out,
Family lawsuits against physicians who honored a patient’s
preference
for
less
aggressive
care
are
virtually
nonexistent . . . and to the contrary, are most likely to occur when
a patient or family does not feel respected or heard by a
physician.143
Physicians often assume that patients desire more care at the end of life
than they actually do.144 The practice of “defensive medicine” is a real cost-driver,
albeit more modest than once thought. 145 A general fear of being sued might
explain aggressive care at the end of life, which in turn encourages false hope and
our denial of death. Ironically, if patients are not sufficiently informed of the goals
141.
Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort
Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 378 (1994) (“[E]conomic analysis has provoked
a large number of critics who claim that tort law does not really influence behavior in the
way that the economists suggest. These critics identify a number of ‘realistic’ factors that, in
their view, prevent tort law from achieving deterrence. None of those who engage in the
economic analysis has done an adequate job in responding to the realists’ critique.”).
142.
Therese M. Mulvey, Cancer Care Is Costly, 4 J. ONCOLOGY PRAC. 77, 77
(2008) (“Although oncologists are infrequently sued, much of what an oncologist does in
the course of the work day is spent indirectly practicing defensive medicine. The added
time, technology overuse, testing, and treatments near the end of life that a patient with
cancer is subjected to are often primarily born out of a defensive medicine strategy.”).
143.
COMM. ON APPROACHING DEATH, INST. OF MED., DYING IN AMERICA:
IMPROVING QUALITY AND HONORING INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES NEAR THE END OF LIFE 323
(2014) (citation omitted).
144.
Lois Downey et al., Life-Sustaining-Treatment Preferences: Matches and
Mismatches Between Patients’ Preferences and Clinicians’ Perceptions, 46 J. PAIN
SYMPTOM MGMT. 9, 13 (2013).
145.
See Michelle Mello et al., National Costs of the Medical Liability System, 29
HEALTH AFF. 1569, 1569 (2010) (“Overall annual medical liability system costs, including
defensive medicine, are estimated to be $55.6 billion in 2008 dollars, or 2.4 percent of total
health care spending.”).
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of care so they can meaningfully consent, physicians may be committing
malpractice by providing, rather than withholding, care.
7. Physician Reimbursement Systems Discourage Meaningful EOL Conversations
Finally, the system of physician reimbursement encourages death denial.
If physicians rely on the cultural denial of death and allow patients to believe that
they may be cured, they can then justify billing insurance for expensive
chemotherapy, ICU visits, and procedures. This is not meant to cast physicians in
an unduly negative light, and their financial incentives may not be consciously
driving their actions. However, if the fee-for-service system rewards those who do
rather than those who discuss, then rational actors will do more. In early 2015, the
American Medical Association gained traction for providing reimbursement codes
for EOL counseling, and by July 2015 the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
(“CMS”) announced plans to reimburse EOL conversations. 146 This would be a
fantastic way to incentivize physicians to take the time to discuss EOL care with
their dying patients.
Any of the factors discussed above could alone encourage cancer
exceptionalism and false hope. Together, they reinforce the American healthcare
system’s rampant denial of death. Unlike many social problems, here we have
massive datasets with overlapping conclusions: The denial of death in cancer
patients is real, and it imposes significant psychological and financial costs on our
country’s already budget-crippling healthcare system. While the law cannot solve
this stunning sociological problem, at the very least legal measures should not
exacerbate it. Many Medicare regulations and federal statutes unfortunately do just
that.147

II. PHYSICIANS SHOULD NOT REINFORCE THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
BIAS TOWARD HEARING AND REMEMBERING OPTIMISTIC NEWS
Psychological research bridging three decades has found that human
judgment is influenced by unrealistic optimism (or “optimism bias”). 148 Even if
aspects of the optimism bias may be particularly pronounced in American culture,
some form of it is found across cultures and age groups. 149 This bias represents the
propensity to underestimate the likelihood of negative events and overestimate the
likelihood of positive events. 150 Studies have shown that this happens as we
146.
Pam Belluck, Medicare Plans to Pay Doctors for Counseling on End of Life,
N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2015, at A1.
147.
See infra Sections III.B.2.b–e; see also Obermeyer et al., supra note 72, at
1888 (discussing the ways medicare incentivizes costlier care).
148.
David Eil & Justin Rao, The Good News-Bad News Effect: Asymmetric
Processing of Objective Information About Yourself, 3 AM. ECON. J. MICROECONOMICS 114,
116 (2011) (observing that participants in a study involving process and acquisition of
information tended to attach more weight to favorable news and incorporate it into their
belief system, perhaps a little unrealistically, while also discounting unfavorable news).
149.
Tali Sharot et al., How Dopamine Enhances an Optimism Bias in Humans,
22 CURRENT BIOLOGY 1477, 1477 (2012).
150.
Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J.
PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 806, 818 (1980); see also Neil Weinstein, Unrealistic
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selectively update our incorrect risk appraisals only when we are being too
pessimistic as opposed to being too optimistic. Put another way, when we are
wrong about the risk of something happening, we correct upward to the correct and
rosier reality, but not downward to the correct and darker reality. 151 The ubiquity
of the optimism bias means that even when physicians do disclose a grim
prognosis and discuss the patient’s need to develop EOL goals of care, the patient
may come away from that conversation focusing on the positive bits, and ignoring
the reality of the grim prognosis.152
This selective updating occurs in part because Americans perceive
themselves as having greater self-control than they actually have. While perception
of self-control is critical to a healthy self-esteem, it appears we actually have
inflated and unrealistic beliefs about our ability to control environmental events. 153
In a series of studies, researchers have shown that even when a situation is
determined purely by chance, individuals will behave as if the situation is
determined by skill and self-control.154 For example, take rolling a dice; people
suppose that they have greater control over the outcome if they personally throw
the dice than if someone else does it for them.155 The only subjects that seem less
susceptible to the illusion of self-control are the mildly and severely depressed.156

Optimism About Susceptibility to Health Problems: Conclusions from a Community-Wide
Sample, 10 J. BEHAV. MED. 481, 456 (1987) (observing that college students were
unrealistically optimistic about experiencing health problems and generally thought that
their own chances of experiencing health problems were less than their peers).
151.
Tali Sharot et al., How Unrealistic Optimism Is Maintained in the Face of
Reality, 14 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 1475, 1477–78 (2011); see also Punit Shah, Toward a
Neurobiology of Unrealistic Optimism, 3 FRONTIERS IN PSYCHOL. 344, 344 (2012)
(describing Sharot’s study).
152.
Researchers found that the bias toward changing our estimates more in the
face of positive shifts in information than negative shifts in information is the result of a
bias in the way we predict cognitive errors, and assign salience to these errors in order to
learn from them. See Sharot et al., supra note 151, at 1478. The strength of the learning
signal depends on whether the updated information is positive or negative. Id.
Neuroscientists have found that selective updating is mediated by regions of the frontal
cortex, which track errors in estimation when a shift in information calls for a positive
update, but show a relative failure to code for information that might induce a negative
update. See id. at 1477.
153.
Shelley Taylor & Jonathan Brown, Illusion and Well-Being: A Social
Psychological Perspective on Mental Health, 103 PSYCHOL. BULL. 193, 196 (1988).
154.
Id.
155.
Id. (citing John H. Fleming & John M. Darley, The Purposeful Action
Sequence and the Illusion of Control: The Effects of Foreknowledge and Target
Involvement on Observers’ Judgments of Others’ Control over Random Events, 16 J.
PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 346, 351 (1990); Ellen J. Langer, The Illusion of
Control, 32 J. PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. 311, 312 (1975)).
156.
See Lyn Y. Abramson et al., Depression, Nondepression, and Cognitive
Illusions: Reply to Schwartz, 110 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 436 (1981) (discussing the
effect that optimism has on perceptions of future outcomes); see also Sanford Golin et al.,
The Illusion of Control Among Depressed Patients, 88 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 454, 454
(1979)).
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This illusion of self-control leads us to believe that we can influence chance events
in ways that will make us healthier, stronger, and better than others.
A second component of the optimism bias is our obsession with the
future, our insistence that the present is better than the past, and our belief that the
future will be even better than today. 157 This aspect of optimism bias may be a
uniquely American phenomenon. When asked about the future, the majority of
Americans are confident that things can only get better. 158 Together with our
excessive sense of self-control, this translates into thinking that even if we have
been plagued by bad luck in the past, we will be luckier tomorrow.
A third reason why we may be biased toward optimism is that we tend to
have a sense of individual exceptionalism. As compared to our peers, we think it is
more likely that we will experience a variety of positive life events, such as liking
our first job, receiving a good salary, or having a gifted child. 159 This persists even
when we have incentives to be accurate in our predictions of the future. 160
Conversely, when we are asked our chances of experiencing a variety of negative
life events, such as being in a car accident, a crime victim, having trouble finding a
job, or becoming ill, most of us believe that we are less likely than our peers to
encounter these events. As one researcher put it, “most people seem to be saying,
‘The future will be great, especially for me.’” 161 Statistically, of course, not
everyone can have a future that is rosier than her peers. This suggests that for most
of us, the unwavering optimism that we exhibit is indeed illusory. 162
Given the above information, patients, when confronted with negative
prognosis information, likely assume three things. First, they may assume that they
have greater control over the course of their cancer than they actually have, and
perhaps just by willing the cancer to go away, it will. Second, they will assume
that simply because the present diagnosis seems bleak, things can, and will,
improve in the future. Finally, they will assume that the dismal prognosis statistics
apply to others, but not to themselves. All of these phenomena are present in
terminal cancer patients.163
157.
See Philip Brickman et al., Lottery Winners and Accident Victims: Is
Happiness Relative?, 36 J. PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. 917, 921 (1978) (observing that an
individual’s ratings of happiness predictions are higher in the future than in the past or
present).
158.
See LLOYD A. FREE & HADLEY CANTRIL, THE POLITICAL BELIEFS OF
AMERICANS: A STUDY OF PUBLIC OPINION 101–07 (1967) (observing that people generally
rated their expectation for future quality of life higher than their current quality-of-life
rating).
159.
Taylor & Brown, supra note 153, at 197 (citing Weinstein, supra note 150).
160.
See Joseph Simmons & Cade Massey, Is Optimism Real?, 141 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 630, 630 (2012) (observing that even when participants
were incentivized to pick winners of a football game, many participants ignored the
incentives and chose their favorite teams).
161.
Taylor & Brown, supra note 153, at 198.
162.
Id.
163.
However illusory, individual exceptionalism is pervasive among terminal
cancer patients. Mary Step & Eileen Berlin Ray, Patient Perceptions of Oncologist-Patient
Communication About Prognosis: Changes from Initial Diagnosis to Cancer Recurrence,
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As previously mentioned, the optimism bias exists even in the face of
random, uncontrollable events. Even so, it can be particularly acute in the domain
of cancer, where individuals have some modest influence over the course of their
disease. Thus a patient may feel she will be healthier and longer-living because she
will have a better attitude, stronger religious beliefs, and superior self-control.
While healthy behaviors definitely impact the occurrence of some types of cancer,
once diagnosed, many types of cancer develop regardless of one’s healthy lifestyle
or positive attitude. Indeed, some researchers argue that “claims that positive
thinking or stress reduction will cure disease,” can place a significant burden on
patients: “[P]retending to be positive, denying negative emotions, denying stress
and distress, etc., are counterproductive to both physical and psychological
health.”164 In many cases, patients feel that society expects them to feel hopeful
and to be a fighter. The inspirational cancer patient is a frequent trope in popular
media and many patients feel pressure to emulate that narrative. If they do not take
on these optimistic roles, they feel they are not being “good” cancer patients.
The idea that we will be statistically-optimistic outliers seems to hold for
life expectancy estimates by third parties as well. Surrogates who were given
prognostic information and then later asked to interpret this information were
much more accurate when the risk of death was low.165 However, when the risk of
death was communicated as being high, surrogates were less accurate in
interpreting these grim prognoses. 166 Surrogates were also much more likely to
believe that unique patient attributes unknown to the physician would lead their
loved one to attain better-than-predicted outcomes.167 Because the optimism bias is
so pervasive, even in the face of discussions of how short a cancer patient’s life
expectancy is, physicians will need to do more than disclose a grim prognosis with
the patient. Physicians should disclose information but also ask questions about
what the patient understands about her prognosis and ability to be cured. They
should keep asking the patient about her own desires and goals of care.
Communication researchers will need to educate providers as to how to deliver
prognosis information that is emotionally sensitive, but factually blunt.

III. EVIDENCE OF THE EFFECTS OF THE INFORMATION GAP
The status quo is that many patients are receiving lots of aggressive care
at the end of life, and some percentage of these patients are not fully consenting to
this care. The sheer volume of aggressive care would be less ethically upsetting if
26 HEALTH COMM. 48, 54 (2011). Even when they are actually aware of the gloomy
survival statistics, they maintain hope by believing that they will be statistical outliers. Id.
164.
Lisa Aspinwall & Richard Tedeschi, Of Babies and Bathwater: A Reply to
Coyne and Tennen’s Views on Positive Psychology and Health, 39 ANNALS BEHAV. MED.
27, 28 (2010).
165.
Lucas Zier, Surrogate Decision Makers’ Interpretation of Prognostic
Information: A Mixed-Methods Study, 156 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 360, 363 (2012).
166.
Id.
167.
Id. at 363–64 (observing that two themes address the trend toward overly
optimistic interpretation of grim prognostic statements, including (1) surrogates’ need to
register optimism when patients are at a high risk for death, and (2) surrogates’ belief that
positive patient attributes lead them to outperform physicians’ grim prognostications).
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the patients were experiencing a meaningful benefit from the treatments, if the
patients understood the purpose of their care, or if ignorance over the purpose of
the care was not driving up the cost of Medicare and health insurance generally.
But each of these conditions has been proven not to be met. The result is that the
care being given is ethically (and legally) unsound.
A. Patients Receive a Great Deal of Aggressive Care at the End of Life
In the United States, over-aggressive care is the norm in cancer
treatment,168 and this phenomenon appears in other cultures as well. 169Aggressive
care includes the provision of chemotherapy, admissions to the ICU, the receipt of
surgery within the last few weeks of life, and late referral to hospice. 170 These
interventions are considered aggressive because they are painful, alienating,
expensive, and not at all likely to extend life or improve its quality. The same
interventions may be justified earlier in the course of care; however, their benefits
are likely outweighed by their risks and harms when the patient is so near death.
While some patients might still opt for these invasive measures, it is crucial that
they do so with a clear view of their prognosis.
Late referral to hospice (defined as within three days of death) is an
indicator of overly aggressive care because patients receive little palliative benefit
when it is initiated at this late stage. 171 Such late referrals have been described as
“using hospice to manage death rather than palliate disease.” 172 This practice
defeats the chief purpose of hospice care, which is to help patients remain
comfortable and be prepared for their death, not merely to outsource the location
of the death.173 While hospice use increased from 2005 to 2009, nearly 30% of
those decedents were in hospice for three days or less, with a large chunk

168.
Craig Earle et al., Aggressiveness of Cancer Care near the End of Life: Is It a
Quality-of-Care Issue?, 26 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 3860, 3860–61 (2008); see also Joan
Teno et al., Change in End-of-Life Care for Medicare Beneficiaries: Site of Death, Place of
Care, and Health Care Transitions in 2000, 2005, and 2009, 309 JAMA 470, 476–77
(2013) (observing, in studying ICU visits and transition services, that there is not a trend
towards less aggressive care).
169.
In a study of Taiwanese cancer patients, “[u]p to 81% of the cancer deaths
presented at least one indicator of aggressive EOL care.” See Chun-Ming Chang et al., Low
Socioeconomic Status Is Associated with More Aggressive End-of-Life Care for WorkingAge Terminal Cancer Patients, 19 ONCOLOGIST 1241, 1247 (2014).
170.
Earle et al., supra note 168, at 3860–61.
171.
Nina R. O’Connor et al., Hospice Admissions for Cancer in the Final Days
of Life: Independent Predictors and Implications for Quality Measures, 32 J. CLINICAL
ONCOLOGY 3184, 3187 (2014).
172.
Morden et al., supra note 79, at 787.
173.
While more of the Medicare population is dying at home, many are
transferred to their homes just a few days before they die. Teno et al., supra note 162, at
476. Thus, using the location of death as a benchmark for the level of care at the end of life
may be deceptive. For cancer patients specifically, 15.5% were transitioned to a different
facility in the last three days of life. See id. at 472. This suggests that hospice enrollment, or
location of death, will not tell the full story, and the care that patients receive in the weeks
leading up to their death may paint a clearer picture.
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(approximately one-third) of these patients coming to hospice directly from the
ICU.174
In the United States, chemotherapy is used more often in the final stages
of cancer than in any other country, with tens of thousands of American patients
projected to be receiving chemotherapy just days before they die.175 The American
Society of Clinical Oncology has sought to reduce this over-aggressive use of
chemotherapy, citing cessation in the last two weeks of life as a benchmark for
improving clinical practice. 176 The percentage of patients who really should
receive chemotherapy in the last 14 days of life is less than 10%, but in the United
States, administration is closer to 20%.177
It is not a surprise that there has been a long-standing concern that
precious healthcare resources are being wasted on unnecessary ICU care. 178 In the
last decade, the rate of ICU use in the last month of life has increased for all types
of patients, 179 and nearly 40% of Medicare decedents are admitted to an ICU
during the final months of their illness. Using hospital discharge data from 1999,
one study found that one-in-five Americans died using ICU services, and this ratio
is only likely to increase given that the number of persons over the age of 65 will
double by the year 2030.180 Admissions to the ICU are both more common and
more resource-intensive because prior to being admitted, dying patients do not
have informed discussions about palliative and EOL care.181 In one study, over
70% of those who died during an ICU admission were found to have received
aggressive therapy, including mechanical ventilation, despite the fact that their
short-term survival from a critical illness was not considered probable.182 Multiple
studies confirm these findings in terminal cancer patients.183
174.
Id. at 474.
175.
Matsuyama et al., supra note 23, at 3490; see also Craig Earle et al., Trends
in the Aggressiveness of Cancer Care near the End of Life, 22 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 315,
317 (2004) (observing that approximately 15% of the 8,000 patients who received
chemotherapy were still receiving treatment within two weeks of life).
176.
See Steven Kao et al., Use of Chemotherapy at End of Life in Oncology
Patients, 20 ANNALS ONCOLOGY 1555, 1557–59 (2009).
177.
See Craig Earle et al., Identifying Potential Indicators of the Quality of Endof-Life Cancer Care from Administrative Data, 21 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 1133 (2008).
178.
Daniel J. Cher & Leslie A. Lenert, Method of Medicare Reimbursement and
the Rate of Potentially Ineffective Care of Critically Ill Patients, 278 JAMA 1001, 1002
(1997).
179.
Teno et al., supra note 162, at 473–74 (observing that nearly 30% of
Medicare patients in 2009 visited the ICU in the last months of life, up from 26% in 2005
and 24% in 2000).
180.
Derek Angus et al., Use of Intensive Care at the End of Life in the United
States: An Epidemiologic Study, 32 CRITICAL CARE MED. 638, 641 (2004).
181.
Mohamed Y. Rady & Daniel J. Johnson, Admission to Intensive Care Unit at
the End-of-Life: Is It an Informed Decision?, 18 PALLIATIVE MED. 705, 708–10 (2004).
182.
Id. at 708.
183.
See Marya D. Zilberberg & Andrew F. Shorr, Economics at the End of Life:
Hospital and ICU Perspectives, 33 SEMINARS RESPIRATORY CRITICAL CARE MED. 362, 363–
64 (2012); but cf. Marcio Soares et al., Characteristics and Outcomes of Patients with
Cancer Requiring Admission to Intensive Care Units: A Prospective Multicenter Study, 38
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Specifically, a study of Medicare patients who died with poor-prognosis
cancer found that over-aggressive care was the norm rather than the exception. 184
Using a cohort of 237,098 now-deceased Medicare beneficiaries who were deemed
likely to die within a year of when the study commenced, the research team
examined the association between hospital characteristics—e.g., for-profit status
and size—and 11 EOL care measures, such as hospice use and ICU
hospitalization.185 The study defined over-aggressive care as care that did little to
improve short- or long-term prognosis, but came with significant risk of reduced
quality of life.186 The team evaluated measures such as late referral to hospice, ICU
admissions in the last month of life, receipt of chemotherapy in the last two weeks
of life, and receipt of uncomfortable procedures soon before dying (feeding tubes,
breathing machines, and CPR). 187 In this exhaustive study, overall referral to
hospice was low (54%) for all hospitals, regardless of size, setting, or for-profit
status. 188 The use of over-aggressive care was high. 189 The research team
determined that “no hospital group excelled”—on any of the indicators—at
providing quality, patient-centered EOL care. The study concluded by saying the
“results indicate a need for a broad reexamination of EOL cancer care and whether
it meets the needs and wants of patients.”190 The obvious question is: Do patients
truly desire over-aggressive care, or do they not realize that it is over-aggressive?
This same Medicare study showed that there was great variation in what
care patients received, which could not be accounted for by their needs or
preferences. Because data on EOL care are not publicly available, patients could
not select clinics based on these differences in the provision of EOL care.191 While
the team noted trends in the types of hospitals that are more likely to provide overaggressive care, these differences were “dwarfed by the variation within hospital
groups defined by common features such as hospital type, size, or for-profit

CRITICAL CARE MED. 9, 11–14 (2010) (finding ICU mortality more closely tied to organ
failure, performance status, or the need for mechanical ventilation rather than characteristics
of individuals’ cancers).
184.
Morden et al., supra note 79, at 791–92 (“Our study of Medicare patients
dying with poor-prognosis cancer revealed a relatively high intensity of care in the last
weeks of life. Some experts, including oncologists, have labeled this pattern of care
aggressive or overaggressive.”).
185.
Id. at 793.
186.
Id.
187.
Id. at 788.
188.
Id. at 792.
189.
Id. (“Our study of Medicare patients dying with poor-prognosis cancer
revealed a relatively high intensity of care in the last weeks of life. Some experts, including
oncologists, have labeled this pattern of care aggressive or overaggressive.”).
190.
Id.
191.
Id. at 790–92 (“Generally, more than a twofold variation was noted within
the hospital groups with common features . . . [this does] not support the possibility that the
observed wide variation in aggressiveness of care could be explained by patients with
distinctive preferences selecting specific care settings. Such an explanation would require
that patients know in advance the intensity of care common at each hospital and choose
their care setting based on that knowledge. There is no hospital-specific, publicly available
information about end of life care intensity to guide patients’ hospital selection.”).
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status.”192 A different study likewise found that the only variable predicting the
aggressive use of chemotherapy in the last month of life was the treating
oncologist. 193 Given that similarly situated patients are receiving very different
levels of care, it is likely that physician preference or financial incentives are
driving the difference, and not the needs of the patient. 194
Many studies have demonstrated that poor people and people of color are
less likely to receive cancer care than their wealthier or whiter counterparts.195 This
holds true for some forms of new and expensive chemotherapy; however, in the
EOL context, this disparity is largely turned on its head. 196 An analysis of
Medicare claims data indicated that costs for EOL care for racial minorities were
18% higher in the last year of life but 25% less in the three years prior to death.197
Lung cancer patients who identify as racial minorities had more ICU days, ER
visits, and inpatient days than non-Hispanic whites.198 The same is true for patients
living in urban areas or those with lower socioeconomic status. 199
The receipt of aggressive care is also correlated with low-hospice use.
Unsurprisingly, race plays a role here as well. Fewer racial minorities are enrolled
in or take advantage of the Medicare hospice benefit.200 The same holds true for
very poor lung cancer patients, as they are less likely to “ever use hospice or be
enrolled in hospice care in the last [three] days of life.” 201
B. Patients Are Not Experiencing Significant Clinical or Quality-of-Life Benefit
to Justify the Aggressive Care
The technological advances that medicine has witnessed in the
last few decades are no more apparent than in the ICU. Yet when
192.
Id. at 791–92 (emphasis added).
193.
Kao et al., supra note 176, at 1557.
194.
For a study that found that oncologists are susceptible to financial incentives
when choosing drugs, see Andrew J. Epstein & Scott J. Johnson, Physician Response to
Financial Incentives When Choosing Drugs to Treat Breast Cancer, 12 INT’L. J. HEALTH
CARE FIN. & ECON. 285, 287 (2012).
195.
Cary Gross et al., Racial Disparities in Cancer Therapy, 112 CANCER 900,
900 (2008) (“Racial disparities have been demonstrated at each step of the cancer-care
continuum, ranging from the unequal distribution of cancer risk factors to inequities in
prompt diagnosis and appropriate therapy.”).
196.
Xianglin L. Du et al., Racial and Geographic Disparities in the Patterns of
Care and Costs at the End of Life for Patients with Lung Cancer in 2007–2010 After the
2006 Introduction of Bevacizumab, LUNG CANCER (forthcoming 2015).
197.
O’Mahony et al., supra note 7, at 281–83.
198.
Preethy Nayar et al., Disparities in End of Life Care for Elderly Lung Cancer
Patients, 39 J. COMMUNITY HEALTH 1012, 1017 (2014).
199.
Id. at 1014.
200.
O’Mahony et al., supra note 7, at 283 (“The Urban Institute analysis of
1995–1998 Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey Cost and Use Files demonstrated that
11% of nonwhite decedents used hospice in comparison with 17% of white decedents.
Fourteen percent of decedents who had incomes less than 100% of the [f]ederal [p]overty
level had hospice use in comparison with 20% of decedents with reported incomes 300% or
greater than the federal poverty level.”).
201.
Id.
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used inappropriately, this technology may not save lives nor
improve the quality of a life, but rather transform death into a
prolonged, miserable, and undignified process. Life support
technology is intended to provide temporary support for patients
with potentially reversible organ failure and not a measure to
conquer death.202
Researchers have also attempted to study the relative value of providing
over-aggressive cancer care. These studies are fraught with problematic qualifiers,
such as “benefit,” which is obviously a subjective measure. Even so, they provide
a means for describing and quantifying the negative impact on patients of false
optimism and the decision to “avoid death at any cost.”203 Unfortunately, this form
of death-denial attitude is associated with patients receiving poor clinical care, 204
dying sooner, and being more depressed just before they die. 205
Many cost-benefit studies focus on the crude metric of mortality rather
than a brief but significant improvement in the patient’s quality of life.206 This is
unfortunate. To move from what most rational people ought to want to the clinical
standard of what this person actually wants—if given the full picture—studies
must incorporate the patient’s assessment of value. The few studies that have
looked at this issue have found that over-aggressive EOL cancer care has been
associated with poor quality of life, poor quality of death, impaired caregiver’s
bereavement,207 as well as increased patient pain and discomfort.208 In addition to

202.
Kelly Wood & Paul Marik, ICU Care at the End of Life, 126 CHEST 1403,
1403 (2004).
203.
Matsuyama et al., supra note 23, at 3495.
204.
Earle et al., supra note 168, at 3860.
205.
The study of pancreatic cancer patients was mentioned in the Introduction,
where it was demonstrated that less aggressive care resulted in patients actually living
longer. See Connor et al., supra note 75. Another three-year study observing patients with
metastati nonsmall-cell lung cancer found similar results. See Jennifer S. Temel et al., Early
Palliative Care for Patients with Metastatic Non-Small-Cell Lung Cancer, 363 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 733, 739–41 (2010). Metastatic nonsmall-cell lung cancer was randomly assigned at
the time of diagnosis to either palliative care or no palliative care. Id. at 735–37. All of the
patients received standard oncology treatment. Id. Quality-of-life scores were higher for the
palliative care group and symptoms of depression were nearly two-and-a-half times more
common in the nonpalliative care group. Id. The median survival was 30% longer for the
palliative care group, which is counterintuitive, given that fewer patients in that group
received aggressive care near the end of life. Id.
206.
Aspinwall & Tedeschi, supra note 164, at 28–29 (“Within the cancer
literature, we believe that focusing exclusively on one outcome—mortality—neglects a
great deal about the process of living with cancer as a chronic and life-threatening illness.
Quality of life, psychological well-being, and other factors related to coping with cancer and
its treatment are important to study.”).
207.
Andrea C. Phelps, Religious Coping and Use of Intensive Life-Prolonging
Care near Death Among Patients with Advanced Cancer, 18 JAMA 1140, 1145 (2009)
(citing Wright et al., supra note 3, at 1665).
208.
See Morden et al., supra note 79, at 788.
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reduced quality-of-life ratings, patients who receive aggressive care at the end of
life also have modest, if any, clinical benefits. 209
In a prospective, longitudinal, multi-site study (a part of the larger
“Coping with Cancer” project) from 2002 to 2008, 396 advanced cancer patients
and their caregivers were interviewed to determine which factors predicted
increases in their quality of life. 210 This cohort study by Baohui Zhang et al.,
followed patients from enrollment to their death, which was a median of 4.1
months later.211 Patients and caregivers were asked a number of questions seeking
to assess their quality of life ratings in the last week of life. 212 This assessment
consisted of ratings by the patient and caregiver in three areas: physical distress,
psychological distress, and overall quality of life. 213 Together, they were added to
create the primary “quality of life” outcome measure.214
The Zhang study found that patients who received any life-prolonging
procedure or an ICU stay in the last week of life were much more likely to rate
their quality of life at the end of life as significantly worse. 215 Patients who died in
the ICU or hospital had even lower quality of life at the end of life. 216 Other studies
relying on the same data have also found that more aggressive medical care was
associated with worse patient quality of life and higher risk of major depressive
disorder in the bereaved caregivers. 217 By contrast, those patients who transitioned
to hospice care sooner rated their quality of life at the time of death as being
higher.218 One of the primary goals of hospice care is to make sure that the patient
is physically and mentally prepared for her coming death, and that she dies in the
way that she is most comfortable.219 So it comes as no surprise that patients would
209.
See id. at 793 (“[R]esearchers have failed to find a survival benefit for
elderly patients cared for in hospitals and regions with higher intensities of care.”).
210.
Baohui Zhang et al., Factors Important to Patients’ Quality of Life at the
End of Life, 172 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1133, 1133 (2012).
211.
Id. at 1133–36.
212.
Id. at 1135.
213.
Id.
214.
Id. at 1135–36. While providing an important starting point, other
researchers have suggested that the term “quality of life” is under-examined as it relates
uniquely to the terminally ill, and perhaps needs to be contextualized for this population.
See Alan B. Zonderman & Michele K. Evans, Improving Patients’ Quality of Life at the
End of Life, 172 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1142, 1143 (2012) (citations omitted)
(“Although Zhang’s 3 items are surely related to the self-assessed value of life, there is
ample room for more work in this area to characterize what QOL (quality of life) means for
patients with terminal illnesses. . . . Although they measured several characteristics while
patients were alive, none of the measures were assessed before the patients became ill or
before they began treatment. This is important because dispositions and personality
characteristics are related to self-rated QOL, particularly optimism, which is 1 facet of
extraversion in the 5-factor model of personality. There is an accumulating literature
suggesting that personality attributes are at least as important for predicting QOL as clinical
factors, for example, in major colorectal surgery.”).
215.
Zhang et al., supra note 210, at 1138.
216.
Id.
217.
Wright et al., supra note 3, at 1668.
218.
Zhang et al., supra note 210, at 1134.
219.
See What Is Hospice?, supra note 73.
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be more at peace with their death if, at the very end of their personal war on
cancer, they forewent another exhausting battle.
At the other end of the scale, patients who were less worried, who
meditated or prayed, who were visited by clergy in the hospital, and who felt they
had a “therapeutic alliance” with their physicians had higher quality of life at the
end of life and were less likely to receive over-aggressive care. 220 However, it
appears that once the meditation or prayer turns into strong religiosity, the scales
tip in the other direction.
For example, a recent study looked at the connection between medical use
at the end of life and religious coping and spiritual support.221 It found that patients
who rated their religious or spiritual needs as being supported to a large extent by
their religious community were much more likely to receive EOL aggressive care,
die in an ICU, and be less likely to access hospice care. 222 The authors posit that
faith groups “may be unaware of the biomedical realities surrounding terminal
illness” and thus may be unintentionally reinforcing false hope.223 In keeping with
U.S. religious demographics, most of the subjects in the study were Christian, a
religion that maintains a strong belief in miracles. 224 The message from the
religious community to “hope for a miracle” may therefore be at odds with any
EOL guidance offered by the medical team.
In yet another study using the rich Coping with Cancer dataset,
researchers sought to determine whether the location of death had an impact on the
patients’ and caregivers’ quality of life. 225 The answer was yes. 226 Patients who
died in an ICU or hospital experienced more physical and emotional distress and
worse quality of life at the end of life compared with patients who died at home
with hospice. 227 This is perhaps not surprising, as the majority of Americans
indicate that their preferred place to die would be at home, not in an ICU. 228 But
these preferences are often overwhelmed by the desire not to give up hope that the
cancer can be cured.

220.
Id. at 1138.
221.
Tracy A. Balboni et al., Provision of Spiritual Support to Patients with
Advanced Cancer by Religious Communities and Associations with Medical Care at the
End of Life, 173 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1109, 1110 (2013).
222.
Id. at 1113.
223.
Id.
224.
Id.
225.
Alexi Wright et al., Place of Death: Correlations with Quality of Life of
Patients with Cancer and Predictors of Bereaved Caregivers’ Mental Health, 28 J.
CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 4457, 4457 (2010).
226.
Id. at 4461.
227.
Id.
228.
Richard Morin, Last Requests: How We Want to Die, WASH. POST (Dec. 15,
1997), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/wat/archive/wat121597.htm;
see also Morden et al., supra note 79, at 786 (“When confronted with such poor survival
chances [dying in one year] in the face of cancer and other illness, the average patient
prefers to spend as much time as possible in a home-like setting with good control of pain
and other symptoms.”).

2015]

DENYING DEATH

1019

Obviously when someone watches her loved one go through a bitter battle
with cancer, the patient’s process of dying can have a profound impact. Studies
have revealed that when patients pursue intensive interventions right up until the
moment they die, this puts added stress on the patient’s family and friends. 229
Death in the ICU was associated with a heightened risk for post-traumatic stress
disorder in caregivers compared with home hospice deaths (even after adjusting
for the caregivers’ preexisting psychiatric illnesses). 230 Similarly, when patients
died in hospitals, their caregivers were at an increased risk for prolonged grief
disorder compared with deaths at home or in hospice. 231 Relatedly, when the
patients rated their quality of life at the time of death as higher, their caregivers
were more likely to rank their own quality of life as better after the patient died. 232
While the focus of this Article is on doing what the patient would want if she were
fully informed about her prognosis, it is useful to bear in mind that the information
gap impacts others as well.
Given that over-aggressive care is generally not associated with reduced
pain, anxiety, quality of life, or quality of death, it is even more startling that it is
also not associated with large clinical benefits for terminally ill patients. Large
observational studies have shown that patients may not be benefiting enough from
intensive treatments to justify the risk. In any event, patients are not adequately
informed about the low likelihood of any benefit. 233 Specifically, when it comes to
ICU admissions for the terminally ill, clinical outcomes are not improving, and
therefore may not be justified by their rising and exorbitant cost. 234 In a study of
nearly 50,000 patients with lung cancer, researchers found that the percentage of
those admitted to an ICU who survived hospitalization and were alive at six
months did not improve from 1992 to 2005.235 Of all the patients with lung cancer
admitted to an ICU, nearly one-quarter died during the visit, half were discharged
home, and the rest of the patients were discharged to a skilled nursing facility or
hospice care.236 An even better predictor for survival was the use of mechanical
ventilation in these patients. Less than a fifth of those who received mechanical
ventilation in the ICU were able to go home after their admission, and only 15%
were alive within six months of being discharged.237
The same goes for using palliative chemotherapy in the last weeks of life.
While studies show that it can improve the survival or quality of life for some
229.
Wright et al., supra note 3, at 1668–70.
230.
Wright et al., supra note 225, at 4461.
231.
Id.
232.
Wright et al., supra note 3, at 1670.
233.
See, e.g., Christopher G. Slatore et al., Intensive Care Unit Outcomes Among
Patients with Lung Cancer in the Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results-Medicare
Registry, 30 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 1686, 1687 (2012) (evaluating the outcomes of patients
with lung cancer admitted to the ICU with the goal of promoting better patient–clinician
conversations once there was a better understanding of the mortality trends and factors).
234.
Id. at 1689 (“In this large observational study, the percentage of patients with
lung cancer admitted to an ICU who survived hospitalization and who were alive at [six]
months did not improve from 1995 to 2005.”).
235.
Id. at 1690.
236.
Id. at 1687.
237.
Id.
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terminal cancer patients, most solid tumors respond to only a limited number of
anticancer drugs.238 Therefore, the aggressive use of chemotherapy may result in
more toxicity than clinical benefit. Recognizing the trap of false optimism, one
research team surmised that this practice of “proposing new lines of treatment after
successive therapeutic failures may be a way of avoiding discussion of prognosis
and advance directives.”239
The tragic reality is that most terminal cancer patients who receive
chemotherapy, surgery, or radiation are not going to be cured. These treatments
might make them feel better, and help them live longer by a few weeks or months.
On the other hand, these treatments might also make them feel worse, die sooner,
likely reduce their quality of life, and it will almost never cure them. Given this,
and given that most patients are not aware of this fact, physicians need to do more
to correct the information gap that leads to false hope and encourages overaggressive care.
Taken together, these findings tell us that the denial of death and overaggressive care lead to a reduction in patients’ quality of life by exposing them to
pain, toxicity, and anxiety with little clinical benefit. It can also reduce the quality
of life of their caregivers. Because of this, physicians should be more careful when
discussing EOL options with terminal cancer patients in order to make sure that
patients are fully informed about the likely clinical and lifestyle benefits, if any,
that they will receive from aggressive care. Specifically, physicians must not
sugarcoat the patient’s prognosis to keep them buoyed for a long fight in the ICU
or hospital.
C. The Information Gap Is Driving Up the Cost of Healthcare.
In addition to disrespecting patients by not fully informing them about the
risks and benefits of their care, the elephant in the room is cost. This Article will
now address the high cost of ICU care and chemotherapy, and how reimbursement
for these services incentivizes the information gap. When patients incorrectly
believe that they can be cured by these treatments, they are much more likely to
agree to receive them. And aggressive cancer care at the end of life is some of the
most expensive care that our system generates. 240 This Section will focus on
chemotherapy, which is unique in many ways. But first, let us discuss the costs
associated with the more general use of the ICU.

238.
Earle et al., supra note 177, at 1134 (citing John Ruckdeschel, Is
Chemotherapy for Metastatic Non-Small-Cell Lung Cancer “Worth It”?, 8 J. CLINICAL
ONCOLOGY 1293, 1293–96 (1990)).
239.
Id.
240.
Chemotherapy is among the most expensive medical treatments available.
See Peter B. Bach et al., In Cancer Care, Cost Matters, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2012, at A25
(noting that the median price for cancer drugs in 2010 dollars was $10,000 per month, with
some drugs costing up to $35,000 per month); see also Neal J. Meropol & Kevin A.
Schulman, Cost of Cancer Care: Issues and Implications, 25 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 180,
180–86 (2007) (discussing the high cost of novel cancer treatments and how they affect
different parts of the population).
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1. The High Cost of ICU Care and Its Furtherance Through the Information Gap
One of the largest cost drivers in the hospital setting is the ICU, which,
despite accounting for roughly 10% of the beds in U.S. hospitals, accounts for
nearly one-third of total inpatient costs. 241 Much of the treatment that was
described above as “over-aggressive” is administered via the ICU. Care provided
through the ICU is estimated to cost three-to-five times more than care provided
on a general medical floor.242 Patients on ventilators account for a large component
of this.243 These patients incur a “disproportionately high share of the total cost of
ICU treatment,” with those requiring more than three weeks of mechanical
ventilation accounting for about half of all ICU costs. 244 In addition to the
magnitude of the financial costs, prolonged ICU stays and mechanical ventilation
predispose patients to a greater risk of hospital-acquired infection and death. 245
These costs may be justified if the clinical benefits are clear and the patient’s
autonomy is respected. However, if the patient is providing consent to ICU
treatment under false pretenses, or if the clinical benefit does not exceed the
personal, emotional, or financial costs, then expensive ICU care is being
improvidently given.
2. The Unique Market for Chemotherapy and Financial Incentives to Deny Death
The market and reimbursement for chemotherapy is unique. Thus, before
describing how chemotherapy administration relates to the information gap, a little
history of chemotherapy is necessary. Forty years ago, physicians could prescribe
only a few dozen chemotherapy drugs, and they had to rely on clunky firstgeneration radiation tools.246 Those early chemotherapy drugs were crude and very
toxic. Some were derived from chemical warfare agents like mustard gas. 247 While
treatment is much more effective now, with many more drugs to choose from, the
drugs remain toxic; their delivery still requires oversight by trained technicians. 248
This means that many infusion drugs cannot be sold directly to patients. Instead,
241.
Joseph F. Dasta et al., Daily Cost of an Intensive Care Unit Day: The
Contribution of Mechanical Ventilation, 33 CRITICAL CARE MED. 1266, 1266 (2005); see
also Neil A. Halpern et al., Critical Care Medicine in the United States 1985–2000: An
Analysis of Bed Numbers, Use, and Costs, 32 CRITICAL CARE MED. 1254, 1256–57 (2004)
(“We document the increasing use and prominence of CCM (critical care medicine, or ICU)
in the delivery of U.S. health care. Although the total number of hospitals, hospital beds,
and inpatient days decreased, there was a dramatic increase in the number of CCM beds and
days . . . . [We] do not confirm unsubstantiated estimates that CCM accounts for 30% of
hospital costs and 1–4% of the GDP. To the contrary, we showed that CCM costs ranged
between 11.5% and 13.3% of hospital care costs and 0.45% and 0.56% of the GDP.”).
242.
Dasta et al., supra note 241, at 1266; see also Halpern et al., supra note 241,
at 1256–57.
243.
Dasta et al., supra note 241, at 1271.
244.
Id. at 1266.
245.
Id.
246.
Lee Newcomer, Changing Physician Incentives for Cancer Care to Reward
Better Patient Outcomes Instead of Use of More Costly Drugs, 31 HEALTH AFF. 780, 780
(2012).
247.
Id.
248.
Id.
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physicians must be dispensed and infused. This used to take place inside of
hospitals, but to curb costs, chemotherapy delivery was transferred to professional
clinics. Because physicians administer chemotherapy, they benefit directly from its
sale.249 The market for chemotherapy drugs is therefore unlike the market for other
types of drugs, where the physician merely orders the prescription, it is filled at a
pharmacy, and insurance pays for some portion of the drug.
a. Oncologists Make Much More Money from Chemotherapy than
from Meeting with Patients or Reviewing Their Care
The delivery of chemotherapy allows oncologists to profit from the sale
of the drugs that they prescribe; in any other context this sort of profit would be
considered unethical or potentially illegal. 250 Oncology practice groups in the
United States buy chemotherapy drugs at wholesale prices on the national market
and sell them to patients. Before 2003, Medicare reimbursement for chemotherapy
generated $1.6 billion annually in profits to oncologists.251
Patients’ insurance reimburses oncologists at some amount above what
they usually pay for the chemotherapy.252 Oncology services make a profit on each
drug that is prescribed, with some drugs yielding large returns.253 Profits can be
particularly high when the average wholesale cost per dose is much lower than the
amount the patient’s insurance is willing to pay. 254 Additionally, because of the
complexity in administration, Medicare pays physicians about twice as much to
administer chemotherapy drugs as it does to administer nonchemotherapy drugs. 255
Private insurance tends to follow Medicare’s lead, with private reimbursement

249.
Id.
250.
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., A
Roadmap
for
New
Physicians:
Fraud
&
Abuse
Laws,
http://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/physician-education/01laws.asp (last visited Oct. 30, 2015)
(noting that the federal Anti-Kickback Statute (42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)) “is a criminal law
that prohibits the knowing and willful payment of ‘remuneration’ to induce or reward
patient referrals or the generation of business involving any item or service payable by the
Federal healthcare programs (e.g., drugs, supplies, or healthcare services for Medicare or
Medicaid patients).”).
251.
Mandy L. Gatesman & Thomas J. Smith, The Shortage of Essential
Chemotherapy Drugs in the United States, 354 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 1653, 1653 (2011)
(“Before 2003, Medicare reimbursed 95% of the average wholesale price — an unregulated
price set by manufacturers — whereas oncologists paid 66 to 88% of that price and thus
received $1.6 billion annually in overpayments.”).
252.
Id.
253.
Reed Abelson, Drug Sales Bring Huge Profits, and Scrutiny, to Cancer
Doctors, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/26/us/drug-salesbring-huge-profits-and-scrutiny-to-cancer-doctors.html?pagewanted=all.
254.
Ernst Berndt & Joseph P. Newhouse, Pricing and Reimbursement in U.S.
Pharmaceutical Markets 21 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16297,
2010), http://www.nber.org/papers/w16297.pdf.
255.
DANIEL LEVINSON, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MEDICARE PART B
CHEMOTHERAPY
ADMINISTRATION:
PAYMENT
AND
POLICY
(2009),
http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-09-08-00190.pdf.
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being tied to the amount Medicare decides to pay. 256 All together, this means that
oncologists have much more at stake financially with chemotherapy administration
than with the prescription of other types of drugs. 257
While hopefully patients are treated in the process, chemotherapy is also
big business. The sale of cancer drugs in the United States is now second only to
the sale of drugs for heart disease, and the large majority (70%) of chemotherapy
sales come from products that are on-patent. 258 The large pharmaceutical
companies had originally ignored chemotherapy drugs, citing the fact that cancer
patients do not live long enough to make the research and development
investments worthwhile. 259 However, the pharmaceutical industry had a “eureka
moment” in the mid-2000s, when marketing executives realized that Gleevec, a
drug developed by Novartis to treat two obscure types of cancer, enjoyed one-year
sales of $2.2 billion. 260 Pharmaceutical companies soon discovered that there is
almost no limit to how much money dying patients will pay for cancer drugs.
Dying patients “will tolerate prices of tens of thousands of dollars a year, making
drugs for even rare cancers into big moneymakers.”261 This realization led to sharp
increases in the availability, and price, of patented pharmaceutical drugs.262 Figure
1 below from 2009 demonstrates how the cost of a month’s supply of cancer drugs
at the time of approval by the FDA (in 2007 dollars) has increased sharply in the
last decade.263

256.
See John W. Hill et al., Law and the Healthcare Crisis: The Impact of
Medical Malpractice and Payment Systems on Physician Compensation and Workload as
Antecedents of Physician Shortages – Analysis, Implications, and Reform Solutions, 2010
U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 91, 99.
257.
See Jennifer Malin et al., Medical Oncologists’ Perceptions of Financial
Incentives in Cancer Care, 31 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 530, 533–35 (2012); see also YuNing Wong, Are Oncologists’ Financial Incentives Aligned With Quality Care?, 31 J.
CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 517, 517 (2013) (“If oncologists think that they will make more
money by prescribing more, perhaps they will write more prescriptions. The rational choice
theory of economics assumes that individuals will act in their own interest. Oncologists are
no different; the current system is set up to reward prescribing more.”).
258.
Thomas Smith J. & Bruce E. Hillner, Bending the Cost Curve in Cancer
Care, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2060, 2060 (2011).
259.
Andrew Pollack, New Drugs for Cancer Could Soon Flood Market, N.Y.
TIMES
(July
5,
2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/05/business/05drug.html?scp=4&sq=cancer%20and%20d
rugs%20and%20price%20and%20new&st=cse&_r=0#.
260.
Id.
261.
Id.
262.
However, the economic pressure on oncologists to prescribe expensive,
brand-name drugs has recently led to shortages in common, cheaper, and generic
chemotherapy agents. See Gatesman & Smith, supra note 251, at 1653.
263.
Peter Bach, Limits on Medicare’s Ability to Control Rising Spending on
Cancer Drugs, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 626, 626 (2009).
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Fig. 1: Monthly Cost of Treatment (USD) from 1960–2010.264
Oncologists make more money from the sale of drugs than they do from
meeting with patients and reviewing their symptoms. 265 This has inflated their
salaries, making them increasingly dependent on the sale of chemotherapy drugs.
Because the chemotherapy infusions are so profitable, many oncology practices
are no longer prescribing regular oral pills that the patient could take at home.266
To do so would cut into their infusion drug profits. As one oncologist put it
bluntly, when you prescribe oral pills, “[t]he patients are still calling your nurses
and talking about side effects, but there’s no payment for that.”267
In some cases, the price of cancer drugs appears to be rising faster than
the health benefits associated with them. This means that cancer drugs are
becoming less-and-less cost-effective. 268 Many new chemotherapies cost more
than $25,000 per year and increase life expectancy by just a matter of weeks or
months.269 Patients are thus “often faced with exorbitant costs, and physicians are
increasingly placed in the undesirable position of having to help patients decide
whether the potential benefits warrant the financial strain that these medications
may generate.”270

264.
Id. at 627. Figure Credit: Dr. Peter B. Bach & Memorial Sloan Kettering
Cancer Center.
265.
Gatesman & Smith, supra note 251, at 1653–55.
266.
Andrew Pollack, Doctors Face Fiscal Squeeze for Treatment, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 14, 2009, at A17.
267.
Id.
268.
Bach, supra note 263, at 626.
269.
Corinna Sorenson, Valuing End-of-Life Care in the United States: The Case
of New Cancer Drugs, 7 HEALTH ECON., POL’Y & L. 411, 411 (2012).
270.
Id.
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Medicare Part A covers institutional care in hospitals, skilled nursing
facilities, nursing homes, and hospice.271 Chemotherapy is covered under Medicare
Part A if it is delivered to a Medicare beneficiary in one of these settings, while
Medicare Part B covers chemotherapy that is administered in an outpatient
clinic. 272 Most chemotherapy is delivered through Medicare Part B.273 Medicare
pays physicians about twice as much to administer chemotherapy drugs as it does
to administer nonchemotherapy drugs. 274
For a pharmaceutical company, being on a Medicare drug plan’s
formulary means that your drug can be administered to the majority of terminal
cancer patients in the United States (those who are Medicare-eligible—e.g., over
the age of 65).275 So long as Medicare drug plans offer at least two choices for
each type of drug, they can typically create their own formularies. 276 Being
selected to be on a Medicare drug-plan formulary presents the keys to the kingdom
for obtaining large national profits. In 2001, Medicare spent $6.5 billion to
purchase some 450 covered beneficiaries’ drugs.277 Seventy-five percent of these
reimbursements went to physicians, mostly for the sale of chemotherapy. 278
Between 2005 and 2007, Medicare paid $1.9 billion for chemotherapy
administration services alone.279
The market for chemotherapy drugs was becoming, and remains,
unsustainable. Under the system as it existed before 2003, Medicare reimbursed
physicians at 95% of the average wholesale price of chemotherapy drugs, with the
“wholesale price” being a value that was largely set by oncologists and

271.
What Part A Covers, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
http://www.medicare.gov/what-medicare-covers/part-a/what-part-a-covers.html (last visited
Oct. 3, 2015).
272.
Your Medicare Coverage: Chemotherapy, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., http://www.medicare.gov/coverage/chemotherapy.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2015).
273.
Gillick, supra note 10, at 45.
274.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.: OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., ¶ 52,904
REVIEW OF MEDICARE PART B CHEMOTHERAPY ADMINISTRATION: PAYMENT AND POLICY,
No. OEI-09-08-00190 (2009) [hereinafter INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT], 2009 WL
9088078.
275.
Gillick, supra note 10, at 44–46 (discussing Medicare’s role in shaping what
medications are taken by dying patients).
276.
Id. at 45.
277.
John K. Iglehart, Medicare and Drug Pricing, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1590,
1590 (2003).
278.
Id. at 1590–97.
279.
LEVINSON, supra note 255 (noting that the rate of reimbursement for
chemotherapy is so high that other drugs requiring complex administration have abused
ambiguities in Medicare’s policies to inappropriately seek reimbursement at the
“chemotherapy rate”). This has led policymakers to recommend that CMS “establish a
process to determine which specific drugs qualify for the chemotherapy administration
payment rate,” and “ensure that drug administration claims are coded correctly and paid
appropriately.” See INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT, supra note 274.
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manufacturers. 280 This meant that reimbursements were inflated. Thus, in 1997,
reimbursements to physicians were on average about 30% above the price that the
physicians actually paid.281 In 2004, this dropped to an average of 22%. 282 This
inflated reimbursement amounted to physicians receiving roughly $1.6 billion
annually in profits on chemotherapy. 283
Congress finally addressed the largely unfettered market for
chemotherapy in 2003, when it passed the Medicare Modernization Act
(“MMA”).284 Embedded within the MMA were provisions that attempted to bend
the chemotherapy cost-curve.285 Some of the measures of the MMA were intended
to improve competition through increased choice. 286 Rather than allowing
Medicare formularies to cover only two chemotherapy drugs, the MMA made
“anti-neoplastic agents” (chemotherapy) exceptional, and it required Medicare
drug plans to provide not just two options per type of drug, but nearly every drug
on the market. 287 While drug-plans could previously assign higher co-pays to
expensive chemotherapy drugs, following the MMA, they are now prohibited, by
law, from keeping most cancer drugs off of their formularies. 288 In theory, this
would facilitate free choice and competition, as drug plans could not exclude
cheaper drugs with similar indications, but smaller profit margins, from their
formularies. Of course, physicians control which chemotherapy drugs are
recommended and ultimately prescribed. Expanding which drugs are on the
Medicare formulary is therefore unlikely to improve patient choice—these reforms
did not work.
c. When Medicare Reimbursement Is Capped, Physicians Prescribe
More Chemotherapy
The MMA capped the reimbursement for cancer drugs at 106% of the
average cost of actual national sales of a drug.289 This cap removed physicians’
280.
Phuong D. Nguyen, A Review of Average Wholesale Price Litigation and
Comments on the Medicare Modernization Act, 9 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 249, 250–51
(2006).
281.
OFFICE. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.
EXCESSIVE
MEDICARE
PAYMENT
FOR
PRESCRIPTION
DRUGS
(1997),
http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-03-97-00290.pdf.
282.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., MEDICARE CHEMOTHERAPY PAYMENTS:
NEW DRUG AND ADMINISTRATION FEES ARE CLOSER TO PROVIDERS’ COSTS (2004),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05142r.pdf.
283.
Renee Twombly, Medicare Cost Containment Strategy Targets Several
Oncology Drugs, 96 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 1268, 1268 (2004).
284.
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act (MMA)
of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.).
285.
See generally Gillick, supra note 10 (analyzing various ways Congress has
tried to regulate the chemotherapy market).
286.
Id. at 45.
287.
Id.
288.
Id. at 45–46.
289.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-3a (2012) (providing the formula for calculating drug
reimbursement amounts).

2015]

DENYING DEATH

1027

ability to dramatically mark-up the profits by inflating what they claimed they and
others had paid. 290 Many were confident that this cap on reimbursement for
chemotherapy drugs would plug a gaping hole in the Medicare drug budget. 291
While it did limit one type of market incentive (inflating their “price,” which
inflated what Medicare would pay), it did nothing to prevent other profitmaximizing practices.292
Specifically, the MMA’s 106% reimbursement cap did not control
volume manipulations.293 It also did nothing to encourage physicians to perform a
cost-benefit analysis and prescribe the best and cheapest drug for a patient’s needs.
Given how significant drug sales had become to oncologists, if the price was
reduced following the MMA, market participants could respond in two ways.
Physicians could either increase the number of patients who received
chemotherapy (volume), or switch from prescribing cheaper drugs (where the 6%
mark-up was less) to more expensive drugs (where the 6% mark-up was greater in
terms of absolute dollars).
Researchers studied changes to the chemotherapy market since 2003 and
confirmed that both of these potential responses by physicians indeed occurred. 294
A study published in 2010 found that “when fees that affect a large share of
physicians’ incomes decline, utilization increases (a “negative” relationship
between utilization and fee changes).” 295 Looking at over 200,000 Medicare
beneficiaries’ claims, the team found that those diagnosed with lung cancer were
more likely to receive chemotherapy after the reform was passed.296 Rather than
reducing incentives for physicians to prescribe chemotherapy, the cuts in
reimbursement led to increases in the volume of patients receiving this type of care
by about 2.4%.297 In other words, “[i]n the presence of asymmetric information,
physicians may distort demand in socially sub-optimal but personally beneficial
ways. In the U.S. context, debate over this issue centers on physician-induced
demand (“PID”)—providing excessive care in response to financial incentives.”298
The 2010 study confirmed that this PID occurs in the provision of chemotherapy
drugs, and was exacerbated when the reimbursement was capped through the
MMA.299

290.
Twombly, supra note 283, at 1268.
291.
Lowell E. Schnipper & Neal J. Meropol, Payment for Cancer Care: Time for
a New Prescription, 57 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 1, 1 (2014).
292.
Id.
293.
Id. at 5–6.
294.
Mireille Jacobson et al., How Medicare’s Payment Cuts for Cancer
Chemotherapy Drugs Changed Patterns of Treatment, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1391, 1397 (2010).
295.
Id.
296.
Id.
297.
Id. at 1394.
298.
Mireille Jacobson et al., Physician Agency and Competition: Evidence from
a Major Change to Medicare Chemotherapy Reimbursement Policy 1 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19247, 2013).
299.
Id.
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Physicians also responded to the provisions within the MMA by
prescribing drugs with higher profit margins. 300 One such example comes from the
drug leucovorin, which has been available from several manufacturers since
1952. 301 In 2008, the FDA approved an active l-isomer of leucovorin
(levoleucovorin).302 The newer isomer has not been found to be any more effective
than generic leucovorin, but it is 58 times as expensive. 303 Predictably,
manufacturing and prescriptions of the new drug eclipsed the cheaper one, and less
than a year after its approval, widespread shortages of the cheaper leucovorin were
reported. 304 As another example, the average wholesale price of Abraxane, a
protein-bound version of paclitaxel, costs 19 times as much as the equally effective
generic paclitaxel.305 Because chemotherapy drugs are not subjected to the same
cost-benefit controls as other Medicare drugs, the more expensive and equally
effective drugs are more often prescribed.
There are no requirements either under Medicare or private insurance that
physicians clinically justify the use of more expensive and equally-effective drugs.
When two or more chemotherapy drugs are available in the United States, their
purchase is not subjected to price controls or demonstrations of greater
comparative efficacy, as is the case in other industrialized countries. 306 Thus,
oncologists frequently substitute generics for higher-profit and brand-name drugs.
As one commentator said, “[w]hy use paclitaxel (and receive 6% of $312) when
you can use Abraxane (for 6% of $5,824)?”307
Oncologists insist that these tactics are necessary for their businesses to
stay afloat.308 Medical oncology is thought of as a “cognitive” specialty, meaning
that it lacks attendant surgeries or procedures for which to bill. Unfortunately,
insurance fee schedules do not reimburse well for patient consultation and the
tracking of symptoms. 309 As the payments for office visits have been slashed,
oncologists have increasingly relied on the profit margins from the sale of
chemotherapy drugs to make up the difference. 310 Oncologists claim that without
drug sales, their salaries would be lower than those for geriatricians (a notoriously
poorly paid and unpopular specialty), 311 and they could not afford the expensive
infrastructure that goes along with maintaining a first-rate cancer clinic.312

300.
Id.
301.
Gatesman & Smith, supra note 251, at 1653–54.
302.
Id. at 1654.
303.
Id.
304.
Id. at 1653–55.
305.
Id.
306.
Gautam Naik & Vanessa Fuhrmans, How Americans May Subsidize EuroHealth Care, WALL ST. J., Dec. 26, 2002, at A8.
307.
Gatesman & Smith, supra note 251, at 1653–55.
308.
James Robinson, Providers’ Payment and Delivery System Reforms Hold
Both Threats and Opportunities for the Drug and Device Industries, 31 HEALTH AFF. 2059,
2061 (2012).
309.
Id.
310.
Id.
311.
GAWANDE, supra note 12, at 36 (“[I]ncomes in geriatrics and adult primary
care are among the lowest in medicine. And partly, whether we admit it or not, a lot of
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d. Chemotherapies Are Not Subjected to Medicare’s Typical CostSaving Measures
Chemotherapy is also unique in terms of its immunity from typical
Medicare cost-savings measures. With other drugs, Medicare introduces price
competition among drug manufacturers by designating certain classes of drugs as
“interchangeable.” 313 This designation means that reimbursement for all
interchangeable drugs is set at a weighted average of national prices, based upon
the sales volume of each drug. This “blended reimbursement” encourages
manufacturers to keep their prices low to be selected by providers for use within an
interchangeable class of drugs. Unfortunately, regulations that are unique to cancer
drugs prevent Medicare from designating related cancer drugs as interchangeable,
which in turn means that each new drug requires its own unique payment rate. 314
Chemotherapy is also immune from Medicare’s “least costly alternative”
(“LCA”) drug reimbursement system. 315 This LCA introduces price competition
by reimbursing at the price of the least costly drug among all that are designated in
a class as interchangeable, no matter which drug is actually used. 316 While the
Medicare program once instituted LCA reimbursement for some clinically
interchangeable prostate-cancer drugs,317 LCA policies for all Part B drugs were
discontinued in 2010 in response to a court ruling, which rendered LCA policy
“unauthorized” under Medicare law.318 A 2012 Inspector General study found that
“[i]f LCA policies for [interchangeable hormone agonists for prostrate cancer] had
not been rescinded, Medicare expenditures would have been reduced by $33.3
million over 1 year, from $264.6 million to $231.3 million. After LCA policies
were removed, utilization patterns shifted dramatically in favor of certain costlier
products.”319 With this precedent, Medicare officials have no incentive to advocate
LCA regimes for chemotherapy. Providers and pharmaceutical companies benefit
from this climate that is unfriendly to typical cost-controls.

doctors don’t like taking care of the elderly.”); see also Gatesman & Smith, supra note 251,
at 1653–55.
312.
See Iglehart, supra note 277, at 1595–96.
313.
Bach, supra note 263, at 627.
314.
Id. at 630–31 (recognizing that regulations and related court cases have
classified nearly all newer cancer drugs as “sole-source” drugs; drugs can only qualify as
“multiple source,” and therefore eligible for being interchangeable, if there are “multiple
compounds that are pharmaceutically, therapeutically, and biologically equivalent, as
classified in the FDA’s Orange Book of approved drugs.”).
315.
Id. at 630.
316.
Id. at 627.
317.
See id. at 627–28. Specifically, the Office of the Inspector General estimated
that in 2002, full use of LCA reimbursement for leuprolide acetate (Lupron, Abbott) and
goserelin acetate (Zoladex, AstraZeneca) would have saved Medicare $40 million, because
the reimbursement rate for the least costly drug (goserelin acetate) was 27% lower than the
alternative drug (leuprolide acetate).
318.
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. LEAST
COSTLY ALTERNATIVE POLICIES: IMPACT ON PROSTATE CANCER DRUGS COVERED UNDER
MEDICARE PART B, at 2 (2012), http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-12-12-00210.pdf.
319.
Bach, supra note 263, at 627–28.
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In some instances, if the effectiveness of a drug is eclipsed by its cost,
Medicare may seek to cut costs by deciding not to cover that particular drug.320
This cost-effectiveness review does not occur with chemotherapy. Despite the fact
that many chemotherapy drugs have not been subjected to a cost-benefit analysis,
Medicare must cover any drug used in an “anticancer chemotherapeutic regimen,”
as long as the use is “for a medically accepted indication.” 321 The MMA law
defines “medically accepted indication” broadly as uses approved by the Food and
Drug Administration (“FDA”), uses listed in one of several drug compendia, or
uses supported in the peer-reviewed medical literature.322 So long as one of these
criteria is met, Medicare is not allowed to withhold coverage of a particularly
costly chemotherapy agent, even if a cheaper and equally effective drug is
available.323
Some of these anticompetitive market practices are unique to
chemotherapy, but some are not. Adding to the lack of competition, Medicare is
not allowed to use its bargaining power to negotiate directly with any drug
manufacturers to reduce prices.324 Together with a lack of cost-benefit analysis and
mandates to cover all chemotherapy agents on any Medicare formulary, it is no
wonder that physicians prescribe the most expensive chemotherapy agents
available.325
e. Medicare Reimbursement Encourages Shifting Cancer Treatment
from Community Clinics to the More Expensive Hospital Setting
In addition to failing to require a cost-benefit analysis for the selection of
chemotherapy agents, Medicare also fails to place any cost controls on the setting
that is chosen for its administration. This leads to chemotherapy being
administered in hospitals rather than community cancer clinics. A 2013 study
quantifies the dramatic shift in cancer care toward the more costly hospital setting.
Medicare reimbursements for chemotherapy administered in a hospital outpatient
clinic have more than tripled since 2005 while payments to the cheaper
community cancer clinics have decreased by 14.5%.326 The study also found that
between 2005 and 2011, chemotherapy administration performed in hospital
outpatient settings for Medicare Fee-for-Service beneficiaries increased by more
than 150% as compared to chemotherapy administered in community cancer

320.
Id.
321.
Id. at 629–30.
322.
Id.
323.
Id.
324.
Id. at 631.
325.
Id. (observing that private insurers suffer many of the same negotiating
limitations that drive prices up for Medicare users).
326.
New Study Shows Shift in Cancer Care to More Expensive Hospital Setting,
CMTY.
ONCOLOGY
ALL.
(June
3,
2013)
[hereinafter
COA],
http://www.communityoncology.org/site/blog/detail/2013/06/03/new-study-shows-shift-incancer-care-to-more-expensive-hospital-setting.html. For a copy of the referenced study, see
Memorandum from The Moran Co. to Matthew E. Brow, The U.S. Oncology Network et al.
(May
29,
2013)
[hereinafter
Moran
Memorandum],
http://blog.communityoncology.org/userfiles/76/Moran_Site_Shift_Study_P1.pdf.
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clinics. 327 The reason is obvious—Medicare reimbursement is higher for
chemotherapy provided in a hospital, despite the fact that community cancer
clinics can safely provide the same service, at a much lower Medicare rate. 328 This
massive increase in chemotherapy reimbursement increases the overall burden
placed on the Medicare budget. Patients may also not be given a choice in
determining the setting of their chemotherapy administration.
The data here point in the same direction. Medicare policies create
perverse economic incentives that are anticompetitive. Current Medicare
reimbursement rates favor those who provide unnecessarily aggressive care in
unnecessarily costly environments. The ICU is reimbursed at a higher rate than
hospice, and providers may be prosecuted for referring someone to hospice if it
turns out that she outlives her prognosis. Doing surgical procedures and placing
ventilators and feeding tubes are all reimbursed quite well, while discussing
whether or not to do the procedure is not reimbursed at all. Administering
chemotherapy in a hospital is unwarranted, but pays much better than the equally
effective community clinic. Physicians who order more expensive chemotherapy
in cases where there is marginal clinical utility will reap the rewards of a system
that has ineffective cost controls. These perverse incentives will devastate our
already crippled Medicare and healthcare budgets, but they are all propped up and
reinforced by our cultural denial of death. Few question the financial motivations
of physicians ordering aggressive or unnecessary care when their patients and
loved ones are not yet mentally or spiritually prepared for death. In the short-run, it
is a perfect system for oncologists. In the long-run, it is completely unsustainable.
The sooner we realize that death is part of the life cycle, the better off we will be—
psychologically, fiscally, and spiritually.
Why did Congress and regulators agree to treat chemotherapy treatments
as exceptional? The answer may be that the disease seems scarier, less predictable,
and more democratic in its wrath. As more people are affected by the death of a
loved one to cancer, Congress is more likely to fund research and expand coverage
for cancer treatments, like chemotherapy.
Of course, a more cynical view is that there is some form of “agency
capture” at work. Agency capture describes a phenomenon of corruption where a
regulatory agency, here the CMS, may be passing regulations that are favorable to
an industry it is intended to regulate, instead of serving the public good. 329 While it
is in the interest of cancer patients to have access to a broad range of drug
treatments, this only serves their interest if they actually have a choice in their
treatment and the alternative that is chosen is more effective. The public interest is
not served by collectively overpaying for cancer treatments and restricting patient
choice.
While it is difficult to track conversations and promises that might be
made between pharmaceutical companies, oncology groups, and policymakers, we
can track the money that is legally exchanged. From 2006 to the present, 18 large
327.
COA, supra note 326; Moran Memorandum, supra note 326.
328.
Id.
329.
See Rachel E. Barkow, Explaining and Curbing Capture, 18 N.C. BANKING
INST. 17, 17–19 (2013) (defining agency capture).

1032

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 57:977

institutional lobbyists reported lobbying on specific issues related to
chemotherapy. 330 This money was probably used to influence Congress to pass
House Bill 1392 and Senate Bill 1221 (an Act to ensure more appropriate payment
for drugs under Medicare Part B), House Bill 3095 (Medicare Reimbursement for
Chemotherapy Drugs), and House Bill 1844 (the “Comprehensive Cancer Care
Improvement Act”). 331 Given that 57 firms lobbied for some issue related to
oncology generally in the same time period, there is evidently a great deal of
lobbyist activity related to cancer and chemotherapy. 332 However, with the
information that is public, it is not yet possible to determine whether the agencies
were indeed captured by the rents that were paid by these lobbyists. Until public
interest watchdogs make Freedom of Information Act requests, it will be difficult
to determine the extent of any Medicare agency capture by the pharmaceutical and
oncology lobbies. Regardless, even absent concrete data proving agency capture,
there is clearly something else guiding Medicare’s decisions in this space that does
not appear to be motivated by public health or fiscal responsibility.

IV. LEGAL WAYS TO CURB FALSE HOPE AND THE COST CURVE
Our culture generally denies death but seems to be even more reluctant to
acknowledge its presence in the face of terminal cancer. For cultural,
psychological, legal, and financial reasons, cancer patients receive overly
aggressive care at the end of life. This aggressive care involves receiving
chemotherapy and surgeries within the final weeks of life, being admitted to the
ICU, being referred to hospice within the last week of life, and typically results
from never having anyone discuss with the patient how she would like to die. In
addition to driving up healthcare costs, these aggressive interventions usually
reduce the quality of patients’ remaining lives and do little to improve their
prognosis. In fact, many patients live longer when they are appropriately referred
to hospice or palliative services instead of pursuing aggressive care.333 Finally, and
most distressing, this aggressive care is often provided under false pretenses, as the
patients assume the treatments can cure their cancers, even though the providers
hold out no such hope for a cure.
The problem is complex and cultural—but it is also legal. While the law
can do little to effect a sea change in our cultural denial of death, it certainly can
operate within its own regulatory parameters to: (1) discourage the reimbursement
of aggressive care, and (2) make sure physicians are incentivized to discuss EOL
330.
OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/ (click “Influence and
Lobbying” drop-down menu in top frame of homepage; then select lobbying from the dropdown options; select “Issue/Specific Issue” from the “Search database by:” option in the left
frame; enter “Chemotherapy” in the search field; click search button for results).
331.
Id. The list of lobbyists includes pharmaceutical companies, hospital groups,
corporate healthcare consultants, oncology practice groups, and community cancer
facilities. Id.
332.
OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/ (click “Influence and
Lobbying” drop-down menu in top frame of homepage; then select lobbying from the dropdown options; select “Issue/Specific Issue” from the “Search database by:” option in the left
frame; type “Oncology” in the search field; click search button for results).
333.
GAWANDE, supra note 12.
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care with their patients. In the following Section, I will suggest a few concrete
legal mechanisms for encouraging behavior that honors an individual’s spiritual
and emotional needs, while focusing on endpoints that promote quality of life, not
“survival at any cost.”334 In other words, I will summarize and elaborate upon the
proposals made throughout this Article that discourage overly aggressive cancer
care.
A. Medicare Should Reimburse for EOL Conversations
The number one way we can correct the information gap and make sure
patients are receiving the care they desire at the end of life is by reimbursing EOL
conversations. Despite the fact that federal law (the Patient Self-Determination Act
(the “PSDA”)) requires inpatient facilities to discuss advance directives with
patients,335 there is currently no Medicare reimbursement mechanism for this. As a
result, patients typically just receive a few handouts upon admission. Given that
there is no financial incentive to have an actual conversation with patients, the
PSDA to date has not been an effective means for eliciting EOL goals of care.
Some private insurers have already started reimbursing EOL conversations
between physicians and patients.336
One of the roles of the American Medical Association (“AMA”) is to
create billing codes for medical services.337 In August of 2014, the AMA created
codes for EOL conversations and submitted them to Medicare.338 One of these new
billing codes covers the first 30 minutes of face-to-face time with the patient
and/or surrogate to discuss advance directives and EOL care.339 An additional code
is provided for each additional 30 minutes of EOL planning. 340 There is no
guarantee that CMS will adopt the change, but if it does, this decision will also
“set the standard for private insurers, encouraging many more doctors to engage in
these conversations.” 341 An important development occurred on this front in July
2015. Medicare finally announced plans to reimburse doctors for EOL counseling
with patients.342 This move would improve the frequency, though perhaps not the
depth, of these important conversations.

334.
Zonderman & Evans, supra note 214, at 1143.
335.
See infra Section IV.A (discussing the Patient Self-Determination Act).
336.
Belluck, supra note 146 (“Bypassing the political process, private insurers
have begun reimbursing doctors for these ‘advance care planning’ conversations as interest
in them rises along with the number of aging Americans.”).
337.
AM. MED. ASS’N, CPT Process – How a Code Becomes a Code,
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Oct. 3, 2015).
338.
Belluck, supra note 146.
339.
Lara Pullen, New End-of-Life Discussion Codes a Step Toward
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19,
2014),
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This is a critical first step. In order to protect patient’s preferences and
discourage aggressive EOL care, Medicare should reimburse for EOL
conversations. Multiple studies show that EOL conversations result in patients
having higher quality of life and death, and with some diagnoses they actually live
longer. 343 Incidentally, these conversations also result in patients using fewer
health care resources, and this may involve resources that the patients themselves
did not want to use. 344 Having EOL conversations can reduce unwarranted and
unwanted over-aggressive care. The main reason these conversations are not
taking place is because physicians are rational financial actors and have no
financial incentive to engage in an already difficult topic. This needs to be
reversed.
B. Medicare Should Designate Some Chemotherapy Agents as Interchangeable,
and Require Justification for Ordering More Expensive Equivalents
Another way to bend the curve would be for Congress to pass legislation
requiring physicians ordering chemotherapy agents to prescribe the LCA within a
class of drugs designated by Medicare as interchangeable. Alternatively, Congress
may require a threshold showing of cost-justification before new and expensive
chemotherapy agents are reimbursed. As discussed above, there are many drugs
that have the same clinical effectiveness, but physicians routinely order the costlier
drug that yields them higher reimbursements. 345 Most other Medicare drugs are
already subjected to some form of cost-effectiveness rule, but chemotherapy drugs
fascinatingly are exempt. These cost control measures would remove incentives
for physicians to prescribe the costlier drugs and could save Medicare millions of
dollars every year.
C. Medicare Could Reimburse at Lower Rates for Procedures Conducted Within
48 Hours of a Patient’s Death
Another means of curbing the trend of over-aggressive care is more
controversial and is being mentioned for the first time here. This approach would
weaken the incentive to perform surgeries, place ventilators, and admit terminal
patients to the ICU in the last 48 hours of life, by reducing the rates of
reimbursement for this type of care if it turns out to be provided in this timeframe
(or another pre-determined timeframe). Of course, the push-back to this idea
would come from the fact that physicians cannot predict when someone will die
with any certainty. While true, it is often reasonably apparent to a physician in an
ICU when a patient is crashing and very near death; this reimbursement-rate
reduction would discourage those physicians from encouraging patients to undergo
chest compressions, tracheotomies, and feeding tubes in the last few days of life.
343.
J. Randall Curtis et al., End-of-Life Care in the Intensive Care Unit, 186 AM.
J. RESPIRATORY CRITICAL CARE MED. 588, 589 (2012).
344.
Id. at 589–90. Specifically, the researchers focused on whether the team
could help the patient achieve her own goals of care, even with an ICU admission. Id. at
588–89. These are likely patients with “an expected quality of life after critical illness that
the informed patient would find unacceptable or for whom the ICU would represent a
burden of care that they would not choose to endure.” Id. at 588.
345.
See, e.g., Section III.C.2.d
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The reduction in reimbursement would ideally not be drastic but would provide
some means for physicians to internalize the cost of their aggressive care in the last
few days of a patient’s life.
D. A Metric Should Be Added for HCAHPS Questionnaires Related to Patient
Awareness of Purpose of Care
It was mentioned above that physicians who have frank EOL
conversations with their patients are more likely to be rated as “poor” in their
communication on national consumer surveys. 346 These surveys were created by
the federal Department of Health and Human Services, and were intended to give
consumers information to compare hospitals on quality metrics. Dubbed
“HCAHPS” (Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and
Systems), the survey represents the first national, standardized survey of patients’
perspectives of their hospital care. 347 Results of the survey are public and are
published on Medicare’s website. Logistically, the HCAHPS survey is given to a
sample of adult patients between 48 hours and 6 weeks after their outpatient
service or discharge, and asks them about such things as their communication with
nurses and doctors, the responsiveness of staff, the cleanliness and noise level of
the hospital environment, how their pain was managed, communication about
medicines, discharge information, etc. 348 The survey is not limited to Medicare
beneficiaries, but the results impact Medicare reimbursement. 349 Starting in
October 2012, a small percentage (1%) of Medicare reimbursement was tied to
“value-based purchasing” bonuses. 350 These bonuses were determined by
comparing hospitals both on their adherence to clinical performance guidelines
(70% of weighted score) as well as their HCAHPS scores (30% of weighted
score).351 Hospitals are already putting a great deal of resources into improving
their HCAHPS scores—from adding air fresheners in the hallways and giving
patients earplugs, to pressuring office managers to shorten patient wait times.
While the data are still preliminary, the reported negative impact on
HCAHPS scores presents yet another incentive for physicians to avoid EOL
conversations. To cut against this, this Article recommends that CMS add new
questions to the HCAHPS survey that capture whether physicians have had
thorough EOL conversations with terminal patients, and whether patients were
given the opportunity to discuss their EOL preferences. Negative answers to these
questions would directly impact the ultimate HCAHPS scores, which would in turn
impact a hospital’s bottom line. As physicians are already encouraged by their
346.
Weeks et al., supra note 20, at 1622.
347.
See
HCAHPS
SURVEY
(2014),
http://hcahpsonline.org/files/HCAHPS%20V9.0%20Appendix%20A%20%20Mail%20Survey%20Materials%20%28English%29%20March%202014.pdf; see also
HCAHPS
FACT
SHEET
(2013),
http://www.hcahpsonline.org/files/August_2013_HCAHPS_Fact_Sheet3.pdf.
348.
Nina Geiger, On Tying Medicare Reimbursement to Patient Satisfaction
Surveys, 112 AM. J. NURSING 11, 11 (2012).
349.
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350.
Id.
351.
Id.
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institutions to improve HCAHPS scores, this provides a very real means of
encouraging, or at least not discouraging, EOL conversations.
E. Hospitals Should Appoint an EOL Counselor for Patients
While some hospitals already see the value in encouraging EOL
conversations, there often is not one person who is charged with ensuring that they
occur. As discussed above, oncologists resist discussing EOL care with their
terminal patients out of a fear that they will be seen as giving up on the shared
recovery plan. They also have financial incentives not to have these conversations.
Intensivists may resist having EOL conversations because they do not have the
same intimate relationship with the patient as oncologists. Nurses may desire
having these conversations but are concerned that this is not their role. Again, this
is a delicate dance where no one wants, or is required, to take the lead.
This Article therefore advocates the use of EOL counselors for terminal
patients. These counselors would be trained in communicating with patients about
their EOL goals of care. Far from operating as the sinisterly dubbed “death panels”
in disguise, these counselors would elicit patient preferences about their EOL
care.352 They would ask the patients questions about their desired quality of life,
how they would like to die, and what type of care they would like to receive. They
would communicate the general risks and benefits of various treatment options,
using multimedia accounts of actual, typical cases, to explain to patients the
potential outcomes of different treatments. The counselors could come from
backgrounds in social work, nursing, or some combination of the two. The salaries
of EOL counselors should be completely independent, ensuring that there is no
personal financial incentive to encourage or discourage certain types of care. The
primary role of the EOL counselor would be to initiate the difficult conversations
about death, ask questions about the patient’s values, and document the patient’s
preferences in their chart. This may or may not result in an enforceable advance
directive. Susan Block described the ideal process:
You sit down. You make time. You’re not determining whether
they want treatment X versus Y. You’re trying to learn what’s
most important to them under the circumstances—so that you can
provide information and advice on the approach that gives them
their best chance of achieving it.353
To this latter goal, EOL counselors should be present at weekly oncology
rounds and should be in regular communication with all of the physicians treating
terminal cancer patients.

352.
See Joshua E. Perry, A Missed Opportunity: Health Care Reform, Rhetoric,
Ethics and Economics at the End of Life, 29 MISS. C. L. REV. 409, 411 (2010) (“[A]s finally
passed by Congress and signed by the President in the early spring of 2010, the bill did not
contain [a Medicare reimbursement code for EOL counseling] because it had become
politically toxic and widely misunderstood as creating bureaucratically-administered
government ‘death panels.’”).
353.
Atul Gawande, Letting Go, NEW YORKER (Aug. 2, 2010),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/08/02/letting-go-2.
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At any time a competent patient could seek to revise their EOL
preferences by requesting a meeting with the EOL counselor. While some may be
troubled by the idea of these “death counselors,” medicine cannot ignore the role
of death in guiding health care decision-making. Physicians have to manage
patients’ deaths every single day. We are robbing them of the resources to properly
do so by failing to incorporate the reality of death into treatment discussions. We
are also robbing patients of the ability to have their last wishes honored.
Responsible institutions can no longer afford to cave in to the political and cultural
rhetoric of “death panels” and death denial.
F. Providers in Accountable Care Organizations Should Be Educated on Value
of EOL Conversations
Accountable Care Organizations (“ACOs”) have their own reasons to
reduce the provision of overly aggressive care. ACOs are thought of as “Managed
Care 2.0” and consist of networks of providers that contract with insurance
plans.354 In an ACO, primary care providers are in charge of patient care and are
held accountable for the cost and quality of patient outcomes.355 Unlike the Health
Management Organizations (“HMOs”) of the 1990s, “75% of an ACO must be
owned by member health care providers and governed by a board elected from
these providers.” 356 ACOs are similar to HMOs, as they vet the necessity, quality,
value, and delivery of care, including cancer care. 357 These organizations have the
opportunity to benefit financially from their savings to Medicare if they cut costs
while offering high-quality care. Medicare has provided the prototype for this form
of managed care, but private insurance companies are also forming ACO-like
agreements with providers.358 Because of their cost-sensitive and evidence-based
infrastructure, providing information to ACOs on the negative consequences of
providing over-aggressive care to cancer patients at the end of life will be more
effective than providing education to providers who do not operate within an
ACO. This could provide yet another model for reducing health care costs.
G. Physicians’ Significant Financial Investment in Chemotherapy Must Be
Stopped
As it is, oncologists make a significant portion of their income from
chemotherapy, and this “chemotherapy commission” gives them a financial
incentive to over-prescribe. 359 Many oncologists are over-prescribing
chemotherapy. While this may not be intentional, the current reimbursement
system encourages them to provide the most expensive chemotherapy treatments,
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as many times as possible. There are a few ways that Medicare could remove this
perverse incentive.
The first way is to remove physicians from the reimbursement of
chemotherapy entirely. Because administering chemotherapy typically no longer
requires the oversight of an oncologist, CMS could change the Medicare Part B
regulations to treat chemotherapy like all other drugs. In this way, oncology groups
would not directly buy or sell chemotherapy drugs. They would, however, lose a
substantial source of revenue. But returning them to the role of prescriber, as
opposed to buyer/seller, eliminates the perversity of physician-induced demand.
Presently, oncologists who work in high-acuity hospitals have an
incentive to keep the provision of chemotherapy in-house, as the reimbursement
rates are higher. To address the concern that the reimbursement for hospitaladministered chemotherapy is eclipsing that of community clinics, Medicare could
experiment with reimbursing chemotherapy at the same lower rate when it is
provided in the expensive hospital setting. This could substantially save costs.
H. Reimbursement for Cancer Treatments Could Be Reduced if They Do Not
Comport with Evidence-Based Guidelines
Medicare could also consider reducing chemotherapy at a lower rate if it
is delivered too late in a terminal cancer patient’s treatment. One way to measure
this would be to key reimbursement to the National Comprehensive Cancer
Network (“NCCN”) guidelines. If the chemotherapy regime was considered too
aggressive by the NCCN’s empirically-tested guidelines, then Medicare would
reimburse for the provision at a much lower rate. This would provide yet another
source for reducing physicians’ incentives to provide overly aggressive care, while
still allowing for overly aggressive care to be provided and reimbursed on a caseby-case basis.
I. Allow Hospice Patients to Receive Limited Nonpalliative Treatments
Presently, in order to receive the hospice benefit, Medicare and Medicaid
patients have to give up life-prolonging health care, no matter how inexpensive or
minimal.360 Terminal patients are often not ready to forego treatments such as
transfusions, certain nonhospice approved medicines, removal of fluid in the lungs,
or outpatient radiation. The inability to access some basic treatments furthers the
sense that hospice is where you go to die, or when you decide to “give up.” This
hinders enrollment and is in part why “fewer than half of eligible Medicare
beneficiaries use hospice care and most only for a short period of time.” 361
There are a few things that could be done to mitigate the problem of low
or late hospice enrollment. One method is to better incorporate palliative services
into a broader continuum of care. This would avoid abrupt changes in the course of
medical treatment and make both the move to hospice, as well as the discussion
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about moving to hospice, less emotionally and physically jarring. 362 Legally,
changes could be made to Medicare’s hospice benefits to allow hospice
beneficiaries to continue to receive basic and inexpensive outpatient care. This
outpatient care might include such things as radiation or blood transfusions, but
would not include surgeries, ICU visits, or chemotherapy. Medicare has already
started piloting a similar program363—the “Medicare Care Choices Model.”364 This
pilot project will begin with over 140 Medicare-certified hospices and is expected
to enable as many as 150,000 eligible Medicare beneficiaries with advanced
cancers and other terminal diseases to receive life-prolonging as well as comfort
care.365 Expanding this pilot project would be another way to curb the provision of
overly aggressive care at the end of life.
J. Development of Better Prognostic Tools for Oncologists
Simple in theory, but perhaps difficult in the current funding climate, the
National Institutes of Health and Institute of Medicine should dedicate large
amounts of money to creating better prognostic tools. Prognosticating is imperfect,
and could be made better by tracking patients longitudinally to see who improves
and based upon which observable metrics. These tools would ideally be based on
large population studies and include cancer genotype, when relevant, so that
oncologists and cancer patients have a better sense of this particular individual’s
likely response to such things as chemotherapy. It is, of course, quite likely that the
average treatment outcome for all stage IV nonsmall-cell lung cancer patients
would be different based on the patient’s age, mobility, genotype, cognitive
impairment, abnormal heart rhythms, exercise routine, smoking history, gender,
etc. Researchers are already doing this, and prognosticating has improved.366
For example, one research team demonstrated that a patient’s mobility is
a reliable and simple proxy for her underlying disease progression. Asking “how
did you get to the doctor’s office today?” can tell the team quite a bit about how
sick the patient is and how likely she is to respond to assorted treatments. 367 A
more elaborate approach calls for looking at performance scores on various
metrics.368 Specifically, having more time pass before progression of the cancer
and having an Eastern Cooperative Oncology Status score (based upon a set of
criteria used to assess how the disease affects the daily living abilities of the
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patient) of less than two were each independently associated with the patient living
longer. 369 Another tool included 18 predictor instruments. 370 The ultimate
assessment was not meant to deny elderly patients access to intensive care, but
rather to help begin objective conversations with families about the dying
process.371 With better prognostic tools, the team felt it would be easier to discuss
whether an ICU visit or further intensive treatment would be likely to improve the
patient’s condition or quality of life. 372 Other studies have looked at variables such
as lymphocyte (white blood cell) counts or lactate dehydrogenase (a particular
enzyme) levels.373 Multiple regression analysis has confirmed that low and high
counts of these last two factors, respectively, are independent predictors of a
shorter-than-average overall survival time. 374 More funding for these types of
studies will empower physicians with better data to confidently predict the life
expectancy for the patient.

V. CONCLUSION
This Article presents problems of enormous magnitude; thankfully, it also
provides a modest means of cutting against those problems. The denial of death
that has developed in American culture for the last several decades has been
exacerbated by the development of amazing life-saving technologies and
medicines. In the domain of cancer treatment, these drugs and devices have been
harnessed to inject much needed hope into the war on cancer. However, the legal
incentives have inadvertently encouraged physicians to mask terminal cancer
patients’ prognosis to the point where many are receiving overly aggressive care at
the end of life with the false hope that they can be cured. This Article recommends
concrete legal changes, mostly to Medicare reimbursement policies, to mitigate the
provision of overly aggressive care. These suggestions need not all be pursued for
improvements in EOL cancer care to be achieved. But each imperfect step
provides an important means of responding to the existing legal mechanisms that
encourage our cultural denial of death, false hope, and potentially unwanted
aggressive cancer care at the end of life.
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